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ABSTRACT
A quasigroup is a set of elements with one binary operation whose multiplication table
forms a Latin square. Because quasigroups are not required to be associative, multiplying
a string of elements together in different orders can produce different results. A message
authentication code, or a MAC, is a cryptographical tool used to verify the authenticity of
a message. In this dissertation, we create a new message authentication code called QMAC
whose security is based on this non-associativity. In order to obtain security against forgeries, a
highly non-associative quasigroup of large order must be used. Methods for efficiently creating
and representing such quasigroups are also discussed.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Keyed hash functions, or message authentication codes (MACs), are a widely studied and
used cryptographic tool. As the name suggests, MACs are most often used to authenticate a
message. A MAC can be used both to ensure that a message has not been changed in transit
and to verify the sender of a message. The key part of a message authentication code is the
“secret” input to the MAC. By definition, the output of a MAC (called a check digit or an
authentication tag) must be easy to compute with knowledge of the secret key, but difficult to
compute without knowledge of this key. In addition, in order for a MAC to be practical, the
key must require a reasonable amount of storage space, and the number of potential keys must
be large enough to prevent attacks on the MAC.
MACs can be created in a variety of ways. Many MACs are based on some other crypto-
graphic function, such as a hash function or a block cipher. The security of these MACs is
then derived from the security of the hash function or the block cipher. However, MACs can
also be developed which are not derived from any other cryptographic process, but instead are
based on some other algebraic structure. In this case, the security of the MAC comes from
properties of the underlying algebraic structure. In (4), Denes and Keedwell developed a MAC
based on Latin squares.
A natural companion to a Latin square is the quasigroup whose multiplication table is the
Latin square. Therefore, it would seem that a MAC could also be created based on quasigroups.
Because of the non-associativity of quasigroups, there is a natural choice for the “secret” input
to the MAC—the order in which the quasigroup elements are multiplied together to create
the authentication tag. In addition, because there are an enormous number of non-associative
quasigroups of large order, quasigroups will work well for this type of application. In order for
2a MAC based on a quasigroup of large order to be easily computable, efficient ways to store
the quasigroup and perform the quasigroup multiplication are needed.
This paper will examine various methods for creating a message authentication code based
on a quasigroup. Chapter 2 formally defines quasigroups and MACs and discusses some of their
properties. In Chapter 3, we will describe Denes and Keedwell’s MAC and then detail how
to create a new MAC (which we call QMAC) that utilizes the non-associativity of the chosen
quasigroup. We will also examine how to implement QMAC and look at keyspace and security
concerns. Chapter 4 will describe several methods for efficiently creating quasigroups of large
order. Finally, in Chapter 5 we will explore how to measure “how non-associative” a quasigroup
is and will look at several methods for producing highly non-associative quasigroups.
3CHAPTER 2. BASIC CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
2.1 Quasigroups and Latin Squares
Definition 1. A quasigroup (Q, ◦) is a set Q of elements along with a binary operation ◦
with the following properties:
1. For all a, b ∈ Q, a ◦ b ∈ Q (that is, Q is closed under ◦).
2. For all a, b ∈ Q, there exist unique x, y ∈ Q so that x ◦ a = b and a ◦ y = b (that is, (Q, ◦)
has unique solubility of equations).
Notice that a quasigroup is not required to be associative, commutative, or to have an
identity element. If there is no identity element, then it doesn’t make sense to talk about the
inverse of an element. As in Examples 1 and 2, finite quasigroups are often defined by their
multiplication table, or Cayley table.
Because of the unique solubility of equations, each element will appear exactly once in each
row and exactly once in each column of the multiplication table of (Q, ◦). That is, each row
and column is a permutation of the elements of Q. This implies that if |Q| = n, then the
interior of the Cayley table for (Q, ◦) forms an n by n Latin square. (An n by n Latin square
is made up of n distinct elements, each of which appears exactly once in each row and exactly
once in each column.)
Example 1. Let Q = Z6 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and let x◦y := x+y mod 6. Then (Q, ◦) is simply
addition modulo 6 on Z6 and the Cayley table for (Q, ◦) is shown in Figure 2.1. Notice that
(Q, ◦) is a quasigroup because its interior is a 6 by 6 Latin square. In this case, (Q, ◦) is also
a group.
4Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 2 3 4 5 0
2 2 3 4 5 0 1
3 3 4 5 0 1 2
4 4 5 0 1 2 3
5 5 0 1 2 3 4
Figure 2.1 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) for Example 1.
It follows from Definition 1 that every group is a quasigroup. However, there are also
quasigroups which are not groups, as shown in Example 2.
Example 2. Let Q = Z6 and let ◦ be as shown in Figure 2.2. Then (Q, ◦) is a quasigroup
because the interior of its Cayley table is a Latin square. Notice that (Q, ◦) is neither associative
nor commutative. In addition, (Q, ◦) does not have an identity element. Therefore, (Q, ◦) is
clearly not a group.
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 3 1 4 5 2 0
1 0 4 3 2 5 1
2 1 5 0 4 3 2
3 4 3 2 1 0 5
4 5 2 1 0 4 3
5 2 0 5 3 1 4
Figure 2.2 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) for Example 2.
2.2 Hash Functions and Message Authentication Codes
According to (7), two types of hash functions can be discussed: unkeyed hash functions (or
simply hash functions) and keyed hash functions (or message authentication codes). Strictly
speaking, a hash function can be defined using only the properties in Definition 2.
Definition 2. A hash function is a function h with the following two properties:
51. For a binary string x of arbitrary finite length, h(x) is a binary string of fixed length n
(compression).
2. Given an input x, h(x) is easy to compute (ease of computation).
However, it is desirable for an unkeyed hash function to have more requirements than just
these two properties. If a hash function is used for cryptographic purposes, it is required to
have one or more of these three properties:
1. Given an output y, it is computationally infeasible to find an input x so that h(x) = y
(preimage resistance or one-way function).
2. Given an input x, it is computationally infeasible to find another input x′ 6= x so that
h(x) = h(x′) (2nd preimage collision resistance).
3. It is computationally infeasible to find distinct input values x, x′ so that h(x) = h(x′)
(collision resistance).
The other type of hash function is a keyed hash function, or a Message Authentication
Code (MAC). A MAC is defined as follows:
Definition 3. A message authentication code, or MAC, is a function hk, where k is a
secret key, with the following properties:
1. Given a value k and an input x, hk(x) is easy to compute (ease of computation). The
value of hk(x) is usually called the MAC-value of x.
2. For an arbitrary-length input x, hk(x) is of fixed length n. (compression).
3. Given a fixed number of input-output pairs (xi, hk(xi)) for i = 1, . . . ,m and any other
input x /∈ {x1, . . . , xm} it is computationally infeasible to compute hk(x) without knowl-
edge of k (computation-resistance).
Notice what Definition 3 does and does not require. We only require that a MAC be easy
to compute with knowledge of the key and difficult to compute without knowledge of the key.
6Because of this, it is possible that with knowledge of the key, it is very easy to find collisions
for the MAC. This situation does not contradict the definition of a MAC.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, MACs are used often in cryptography to create a check digit
(i.e. an authentication tag) or to authenticate a message. If Bob wants to make sure that
the message he receives was really sent by Alice and that this message hasn’t been altered or
corrupted in transit, he can accomplish this by using a MAC. Alice and Bob simply need to
decide on a MAC and exchange the secret key. Alice then computes the MAC-value associated
with the message prior to sending it and appends this value to the end of the message. When
Bob receives the message, he checks that the appended authentication tag is indeed the correct
MAC-value and therefore verifies that the message has come from Alice (or from someone else
with knowledge of the secret key) and that the message has not been changed in transit. If Eve,
who does not have knowledge of the secret key, wants to either substitute her own message or
alter the message, she will be unable to do so because of the computation resistance property
of the MAC. In fact, even if Eve has seen a fixed number of previous messages sent from Alice
to Bob with the authentication tags attached, she will still be unable to change the current
message or substitute a new one because of the computation resistance property of the MAC.
This does require that Alice and Bob change the value of k when a large number of messages
have been sent, so as to not give any information away to Eve about the value of k or about
how to compute authentication tags.
7CHAPTER 3. AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES USING QUASIGROUPS
3.1 Denes and Keedwell Scheme
Recall that as discussed in Section 2.2, message authentication codes (or MACs) are used
to authenticate messages. If Alice and Bob are the only two people who share a secret key
for a MAC, they can use the MAC and the secret key to create a check digit (also known as
a MAC-value or an authentication tag) for a message. This check digit is then appended on
to the end of the message. When Bob receives a message from Alice (or vice versa), Bob will
use his knowledge of the key to compute the check digit and verify the message. If the check
digit that Bob computes matches the check digit appended onto the message, then Bob can be
sure that the message came from Alice, because she is the only other person with knowledge
of the secret key (and therefore, the only person with knowledge of how to compute the check
digit). If the check digits do not match, then Bob knows either that the message is not from
Alice or that it was changed in transit. Either way, Bob knows not to trust the contents of the
message.
Therefore, in order to create a MAC, a function hk(x) is needed where hk has the properties
described in Definition 3. In particular, hk(x) should be easy to compute with knowledge of
k and difficult to compute without knowledge of k. MACs have been created from a variety
of mathematical structures which use many different pieces of information for the secret key.
One classic example of a MAC is a hash-based MAC, called HMAC.
Definition 4. Let h be a hash function (as defined in Definition 2) and let k be a key. Create
a MAC (called HMAC) by defining
HMAC(x) = h(k‖p1‖h(k‖p2‖x))
8where p1 and p2 are distinct strings used to pad k to a full block (that is, make the input to
HMAC the appropriate length) and ‖ denotes concatenation.
Because h is a hash function, it is a one-way function according to Definition 2. Therefore,
HMAC(x) will be difficult to compute without knowledge of k, because both inputs to h (that
is, k‖p2‖x and k‖p1‖h(k‖p2‖x)) will be unknown.
In (4), Denes and Keedwell suggest using a quasigroup (Q, ◦) and its binary operation to
create a MAC. Their scheme is outlined below.
Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup, where |Q| = q. Assume that m = m1,m2, . . . ,mn is a message
over (Q, ◦) and assume that we wish to create a signature consisting of b0, b1, . . . , bs−1 for m,
where bi ∈ Q for i = 0, . . . , s − 1. Choose t so that n = st. We will separate m into s
mutually disjoint subsets Si, for i = 0, . . . , s − 1 where each Si consists of exactly t elements
of the message. (If the message length n is not an exact multiple of t, so that we have
n = (s − 1) ∗ t + r where 0 < r < t, then create the subsets so that the last subset Ss−1
contains r message elements instead of t elements.) Assume that Si = {mi1 ,mi2 , . . . ,mit}.
Then calculate bi by
bi = [({(mi1 ◦mi2) ◦mi3} ◦mi4) ◦ · · · ] ◦mit
The message and signature are then sent as m1, . . . ,mn, b0, . . . , bs−1.
As with any other MAC, the objective of this scheme is to authenticate a messagem1, . . . ,mn
by computing b0, . . . , bs−1 and appending this to the end of the message. The expectation is
that without knowledge of the key (in this case, how the sets Si are created), an attacker
will not be able to compute b0, . . . , bs−1 correctly. Therefore, a message which has the correct
MAC value (that is, the correct values of b0, . . . , bs−1) must have been sent by someone with
knowledge of the key, and so the message can be authenticated.
Because the parenthesis scheme is the same for computing every value of bi, the security
of the scheme lies in how the sets Si are created. Denes and Keedwell suggest the following
method for this creation.
Define a Latin square L which will be used to create Si. If s many subsets Si are to be
created, then L should consist of the elements {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}. Notice that L will contain
9s2 elements, so the positions in L can be labeled from 1 to s2, beginning with the upper left
corner, traveling across the first row, returning to the leftmost element in the second row,
and so on. Then each element from {0, 1, . . . , s − 1} will have exactly s numbered positions
associated with it. If i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s− 1} has associated positions i1, i2, . . . , is, then the subset
Si will consist of message elements mi1 ,mi2 , . . . ,mis .
This method of creating a signature b0, b1, . . . , bs−1 can be thought of as a MAC. Denote
this MAC by hk, where hk(mi1 ,mi2 , . . . ,mit) = bi. This implies that the private information
is the method of dividing the message m into sets S0, S1, . . . , Ss−1. Because the Latin square
L was used to create these sets, the key for this MAC is L.
In this method, we are working with both a quasigroup (Q, ◦) and a Latin square L. In
order to reduce the storage space needed, Denes and Keedwell suggest using the same structure
for both (Q, ◦) and L. Notice, however, that this implies that (Q, ◦) cannot be made public.
Example 3. Assume that we would like to create a signature using the method above for the
message 1033210322001120 using the Latin square L given in Figure 3.1. Then n = 16 and
we choose s = 4, implying that t = 4. Subset S0 will consist of the 2nd, 8th, 11th, and 13th
message elements, because 0 appears in positions 2, 8, 11, and 13 of L. S1 will consist of the
1st, 6th, 12th, and 15th message elements, because 1 appears in positions 1, 6, 12, and 15 of
L. S2 and S3 can be similarly constructed.
L =
1 0 3 2
3 1 2 0
2 3 0 1
0 2 1 3
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 1 0 3 2
1 3 1 2 0
2 2 3 0 1
3 0 2 1 3
Figure 3.1 The Latin square L and its associated quasigroup (Q, ◦).
If we choose to use the quasigroup (Q, ◦) created by using L as its multiplication table as
suggested above, then the signature is as follows:
S0 = 0, 3, 0, 1 b0 = [(0 ◦ 3) ◦ 0] ◦ 1 = (2 ◦ 0) ◦ 1 = 2 ◦ 1 = 3
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S1 = 1, 1, 0, 2 b1 = [(1 ◦ 1) ◦ 0] ◦ 2 = (1 ◦ 0) ◦ 2 = 3 ◦ 2 = 1
S2 = 3, 0, 2, 1 b2 = [(3 ◦ 0) ◦ 2] ◦ 1 = (0 ◦ 2) ◦ 1 = 3 ◦ 1 = 2
S3 = 3, 2, 2, 0 b3 = [(3 ◦ 2) ◦ 2] ◦ 0 = (1 ◦ 2) ◦ 0 = 2 ◦ 0 = 2
Therefore, the message and signature are sent as 10332103220011203122.
As with virtually any MAC, there are both positive and negative aspects of Denes and
Keedwell’s scheme. One positive aspect deals with security. Although Denes and Keedwell
do not discuss the security of this scheme in (4), the security is analyzed in (2). Dawson,
Donovan, and Offer conclude that if the product is obtained by multiplying consecutive digits
of the message together, then it is possible for an eavesdropper to forge a signature. This
corresponds to simply letting Si = {mi(s−1)+1,mi(s−1)+2, . . . ,mis} for i = 0, . . . , s−1. However,
if a Latin square is used to divide the message up into the sets Si, then Dawson, Donovan,
and Offer conclude that this method is secure against the attack developed in their paper.
Other than (2), there have been no other papers published exploring the security of Denes
and Keedwell’s authentication scheme, so it appears that currently, the scheme is considered
secure.
In addition to the apparent security of this method, another positive aspect can be seen in
the necessary computations that need to be performed. If the Latin square L (and hence the
corresponding quasigroup (Q, ◦)) are exchanged ahead of time, the sets Si can be “precom-
puted”. That is, even though the message elements aren’t yet known (because the message
hasn’t been sent yet), it can be determined that Si will consist of the message elements in
positions i1, i2, . . . , it. When the message is sent, the actual contents of Si can be quickly com-
puted. The only other computation which cannot be performed until the message is sent or
received is the multiplication of the elements of Si to calculate bi. However, this is a relatively
fast process because it only involves quasigroup multiplications.
There are also negative aspects of this MAC. It appears that the most problematic aspect
is the fact that the key is a quasigroup, possibly one which is quite large (depending on the
block size chosen for the message). If Alice and Bob wish to use this MAC to authenticate
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messages, they would need to find a way to efficiently represent the quasigroup (Q, ◦) and
also find a way to exchange (Q, ◦) securely. In addition, if Alice and Bob want to create an
authentication tag of s digits, then (Q, ◦) would need to consist of s2 many elements, making
(Q, ◦) quite large to store.
Another negative feature of Denes and Keedwell’s scheme is that it does not quite satisfy
the requirements for a MAC. In Definition 3, it is required that a MAC produce a fixed-length
output. However, the output from this scheme is b0, b1, . . . , bs−1, which depends on the value
of s.
One final negative aspect of this MAC comes from the fact that properties of the quasigroup
(Q, ◦) are not being utilized. This authentication scheme would work if we used a group G
instead of a quasigroup (Q, ◦), especially since the parentheses scheme used to create bi remains
fixed for any set Si and any quasigroup (Q, ◦). That is, bi is created by multiplying all the
elements in Si together from left to right. Because (Q, ◦) is a quasigroup, (Q, ◦) could be chosen
so that it is non-associative. However, by multiplying from left to right, this non-associativity
is not beng exploited. Therefore, a new MAC (which we call QMAC) can be created which
relies on the non-associativity of (Q, ◦) for its security. QMAC is discussed in Section 3.2.
3.2 Creation of QMAC
Denes and Keedwell’s message authentication scheme (or MAC) discussed in Section 3.1
can be modified to create a MAC (called QMAC) which utilizes the non-associative properties
of quasigroups. In QMAC, the elements of the message will again be thought of as elements of
some quasigroup (Q, ◦). Unlike the scheme in (4), (Q, ◦) can be made public. The secret key
for QMAC will be the order in which the message elements are multiplied together to create
the MAC-value. If the quasigroup (Q, ◦) is chosen to be non-associative, then the order in
which message elements are multiplied will change the check digit that is created. Essentially,
this allows us to have a parentheses scheme as the secret key.
Definition 5. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup.
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1. By a parenthesis scheme on x1, x2, . . . , xt, we simply mean a choice of parenthesizing
x1◦x2◦· · ·◦xt so that it forms a well-defined expression in the non-associative operation ◦.
2. A QMAC key of length t is a parenthesis scheme on x1, . . . , xt along with a constant
c ∈ Q.
The authentication tag for a messagem is then computed by multiplying the message elements
together in the order specified by the key, except that every innermost multiplication (xi◦xi+1)
is replaced by (xi ◦ c) ◦ xi+1.
Example 4. Let Q = {0, 1, . . . , 7} and let the Cayley table for (Q, ◦) be given in Figure 3.2.
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 5 3 2 1 7 6 0 4
1 0 6 5 4 2 1 3 7
2 2 0 7 6 4 3 5 1
3 7 5 4 3 1 0 2 6
4 6 4 3 2 0 7 1 5
5 3 1 0 7 5 4 6 2
6 4 2 1 0 6 5 7 3
7 1 7 6 5 3 2 4 0
Figure 3.2 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) for Example 4.
Assume that we want to create a check digit for the messagem = 146277. If we choose the
key to be the parenthesis scheme (m1 ◦m2) ◦ (((m3 ◦m4) ◦m5) ◦m6) along with the constant
c = 3, then our authentication tag is
hk(m) = ((1 ◦ 3) ◦ 4) ◦ ((((6 ◦ 3) ◦ 2) ◦ 7) ◦ 7)
= (4 ◦ 4) ◦ (((0 ◦ 2) ◦ 7) ◦ 7)
= 0 ◦ ((2 ◦ 7) ◦ 7)
= 0 ◦ (1 ◦ 7)
= 0 ◦ 7
= 4
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and so the message and the authentication tag would be sent as 1462774.
The number of possible parentheses schemes will be discussed in Section 3.3.2, and it can
be seen that unless (Q, ◦) is very large, there are more parentheses schemes than quasigroup
elements. Therefore, the pigeonhole principle says that there will be collisions (that is, two
different parentheses schemes which produce the same authentication tag). However, it appears
to be difficult to find one of these collisions without knowledge of the key, so QMAC still satisfies
the properties required by Definition 3.
3.3 Implementation of QMAC
We showed how to calculate hk(m1,m2, . . . ,mt) in Example 4, where t is the number of
inputs that the function hk takes. This implies that if our message m consists of exactly t
elements, we can calculate hk(m). However, this situation is extremely unlikely to occur in
practice, because messages are usually quite long and vary in length. Therefore, we need to
consider methods of creating an authentication tag for a message which consists of more than
t elements. Several possible methods will be discussed in Section 3.3.1. For ease of notation,
let hk(m1, . . . ,mt) denote the multiplication of m1, . . . ,mt in the order specified by k and let
H(m) denote the authentication tag created for the message m.
In addition to the above concern, we also need to consider issues regarding the key. Because
a QMAC key is a parenthesis scheme on t elements along with a single quasigroup element,
we need to have some way of representing the key. The size of the keyspace also needs to
be examined. Notice that the size of the keyspace depends on t and on |Q|. These topics
associated with the key will be discussed in Section 3.3.2.
Finally, the security of this MAC will be examined in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Implementing QMAC on a longer message
Before discussing how to compute H(m), notice that there is an important difference
between QMAC and the MAC created by Denes and Keedwell. Recall that the security of
Denes and Keedwell’s MAC is derived from the way the sets Si are created. This means that
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in order to maintain the MAC’s security, the method for breaking the message up into blocks
needs to be kept secret. However, in QMAC, the security depends on the order in which the
message elements are multiplied together. Therefore, we don’t need to be at all concerned
about how the message is broken up into blocks. We can break the message up into blocks in
any way that we choose, and we can make this method of creating blocks public.
There are several different methods that can be used to define Hk(m) from hk. The
description of each method follows, along with an analysis of its space and time complexity.
In each case, assume that hk takes t message elements as input.
Method 1: This method is similar to the way that many “traditional” hash functions are
implemented, by treating hk as a compression function and beginning with a fixed initial value
(IV ) which is an element of (Q, ◦). The MAC value computed in the previous step is used as
one of the inputs to hk, which is being computed in the current step. For this method, assume
that m consists of (t− 1) · l quasigroup elements for some positive integer l. That is, assume
m = m1,m2, . . . ,m(t−1)l, where mi ∈ Q for i = 1, . . . , (t − 1)l. If necessary, Alice can pad
the message m in order to make its length a multiple of t− 1. That is, Alice can add data to
the end of the message to make it the correct length. This data could either be random or it
could contain information about the message, such as its length and blocksize. This method
is described by
x0 = IV ∈ Q
xi = hk
(
xi−1,m(i−1)(t−1)+1, . . . ,mi(t−1)
)
for i = 1, . . . , l
Hk(m) = xl
Storage: Notice that the hash value xi is only used to compute the value of xi+1. This
means that when xi+1 is computed, there is no longer any need to store xi, so xi+1 can replace
xi in the storage queue. Therefore, in addition to the storage needed for the message, this
method requires that only one additional quasigroup element be stored.
Time: In order to analyze the time complexity of each method, we first need to determine
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how many quasigroup multiplications will be performed. In Method 1, because i = 1, . . . , l, we
need to compute hk l-many times. Notice, however, that we do not know the exact number of
quasigroup multiplications each computation of hk requires because each innermost product
in k requires one additional multiplication. Since the number of variables in the parenthesis
scheme is t, we can certainly bound the total number of quasigroup multiplications by 2tl.
Thus the time complexity is linear in the size of the message.
Method 2: For this method, assume that |m| = t · l, again padding m if necessary. This
method is similar to Method 1. It is described by
x0 = IV ∈ Q
xi = xi−1 ◦ hk
(
m(i−1)t+1, . . . ,mit
)
for i = 1, . . . , l
Hk(m) = xl.
Storage: As in Method 1, the hash value xi is only used to compute the value of xi+1.
When xi+1 is computed, there is no longer any need to store xi, so xi+1 can replace xi in the
storage queue. Therefore, in addition to the storage needed for the message, this method also
requires that only one additional quasigroup element be stored.
Time: Again, we need to compute hk l-many times. As in Method 1, we can bound the
total number of quasigroup multiplications by 2tl. Thus the time complexity is again linear in
the length of the message. So Method 2 requires the same amount of storage and approximately
the same amount of time as Method 1.
Method 3: For this method, we arrange the message elements as the levels in a complete,
balanced t-ary tree. Each internal node of the tree is obtained by applying hk to its t descen-
dants. The final value of Hk(m) is the value at the root node. A pictorial representation for
Method 3 when t = 3 can be seen in Figure 3.3. For ease of notation, let m′1 = hk(m1,m2,m3),
m′2 = hk(m4,m5,m6), and so on.
This method can be implemented using a single push-down stack. The stack accepts ordered
pairs (q, j) in which q is a quasigroup element and j is a natural number corresponding to the
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m1,m2,m3︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′1
m4,m5,m6︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′2
m7,m8,m9︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′3︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′′1
m10,m11,m12︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′4
m13,m14,m15︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′5
m16,m17,m18︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′6︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′′2
etc.
Figure 3.3 A pictorial representation of Method 3.
level in the tree at which q appeares. Begin with the stack empty and proceed according to
the following algorithm.
1. For i = 1 to n do
2. Push (mi, 0) onto stack
3. If top t elements of stack all have same level j, then
4. Pop t elements from stack
5. Apply hk to obtain value q
6. Push (q, j + 1) onto stack
7. Goto (3)
8. Fi
9. Od
It is most natural to apply this algorithm to a message of length n = tl. In that case, upon
completion of the main loop, the stack will contain a single element (q, l) and the value of
Hk(m) will be q.
Storage: It is easy to see that at any point in the algorithm, the level components (that
is, the second component in (q, j)) increase as we go down the stack. In addition, there are
never more than t − 1 entries of any level on the stack at once. It therefore follows that the
maximum stack size is (t− 1)l entries, which is logarithmic in the length of the message.
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Time: The number of applications of hk is equal to the number of internal nodes in the
tree, which is 1 + t + t2 + · · · + tl−1. Since each application of hk requires approximately t
quasigroup multiplications, the total time involved is t ·
(
tl−1
t−1
)
≈ tl − 1.
As we have seen, all three approaches run in linear time. However, unlike Method 3,
Methods 1 and 2 require only a constant amount of auxiliary storage. Method 3, on the other
hand, does not use an initial value and may pipeline better. It is not clear whether or not these
advantages for Method 3 outweigh the increased storage requirements or the added complexity
of the algorithm.
3.3.2 Keyspace Concerns
Recall that the key for QMAC is an order for performing multiplication on a string of t
quasigroup elements (represented by a parenthesis scheme) along with a quasigroup element c.
We need to describe how to represent this key, discuss the size of the keyspace, and determine
how large t needs to be in order to have an acceptably large keyspace.
Representing the Key. The way that we choose to represent the key involves changing
the parentheses order into a string of numbers. For example, if t = 7, consider the following
grouping of parentheses:
((m1 ◦↑
1
m2) ◦↑
2
m3) ◦↑
3
((m4 ◦↑
4
(m5 ◦↑
5
m6)) ◦↑
6
m7)
We could represent this parentheses scheme as 1, 2, 5, 4, 6, 3, because the first multiplication
performed is 1, followed by 2, then multiplication 5 is performed, and so on. Notice that there
are multiple ways of representing this parentheses scheme. A few are:
1, 2, 5, 4, 6, 3
1, 5, 2, 4, 6, 3
5, 4, 6, 1, 2, 3
Because a QMAC key involves both a parenthesis scheme and an additional quasigroup element
c, the QMAC key corresponding to the parenthesis scheme detailed above could be represented
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as 1, 2, 5, 4, 6, 3, c. In this case, the innermost products are m1 ◦m2 and m5 ◦m6. Therefore,
hk would be computed as follows.
hk(m1, . . . ,m7) = (((m1 ◦ c) ◦m2) ◦m3) ◦ ((m4 ◦ ((m5 ◦ c) ◦m6)) ◦m7).
Storage Needed for the Key. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, there are t− 1 quasigroup
operations that are performed when hk is computed. This means that the key will be a
permutation of the set {1, . . . , t−1}, along with an additional quasigroup element c. Therefore,
the space required to store the key is (t− 1) lg (t− 1) + lg |Q|, which is approximately linear
in the number of inputs to hk and logarithmic in the size of (Q, ◦).
Size of the Keyspace. At first glance, because the keys are simply permutations of
{1, . . . , t− 1} along with a quasigroup element c, it seems as though the keyspace should have
size (t−1)!·|Q|. However, because there are some keys which have more than one representation
(see the previous discussion), the size of the keyspace is actually smaller. Notice that it is true
that the keyspace contains (t− 1)! · |Q| valid keys. However, if two of these keys produce the
same parentheses scheme, as soon as an attacker finds one of these keys the security of QMAC
will be compromised. It doesn’t matter whether the attacker finds the representation of the
key that was actually used or not—what matters is that he has found the parentheses scheme
that QMAC uses, and hence has found the secret key.
To determine the number of unique keys in the keyspace, we need to know the number of
ways to uniquely parenthesize a string of t elements. This is equal to Ct−1, where Cn is the
nth Catalan number. So |K| = Ct−1 · |Q|. There are several equivalent formulas for Cn. The
formula given in (13) is
Cn =
1
n+ 1
(
2n
n
)
=
(2n)!
n!(n+ 1)!
It turns out that C68 < 2128 < C69, so if a keyspace containing 2128 elements is desired, hk
would need to take at most 70 quasigroup elements as input (that is, we would need t ≤ 70).
Because the quasigroup (Q, ◦) will probably be quite large, hk could take significantly fewer
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quasigroup elements as input and still have a keyspace containing 2128 elements. If |Q| = 28,
hk would need to take at most 66 quasigroup elements as input. If |Q| = 216, we would need
at most 62 inputs to hk. Choosing (Q, ◦) so that |Q| = 232 requires that hk only take 52
quasigroup elements as input.
Asymptotically, Cn ∼ 4
n
n3/2
√
pi
. Notice that Cn = Ω(2n), because
log2Cn = n log2 4−
3
2
log2 n− log2
√
pi
= 2n− 3
2
log2 n− .82575
> 2n− n− .82575 (3.1)
= n− .82575
∼ n
where (3.1) holds because log2 n <
2
3n for n ≥ 3. This implies that Cn ∼ 2n or Cn = Ω(2n).
Therefore, the size of the keyspace increases exponentially in the length of the key.
3.3.3 Security Concerns.
Before we can consider the security of QMAC, we need to understand what it means for
a MAC to be secure. Assume that Alice and Bob are sending messages back and forth and
assume that Eve is an attacker. Eve’s goal is to disrupt the communication between Alice or
Bob, which she can do in several ways. Eve could intercept a message from Alice to Bob (or
vice versa), alter the message, and then re-send it. She could also create her own message
and send it to Alice, pretending that the message came from Bob (or vice versa). If Alice and
Bob are using a MAC to provide authentication for their messages, then either attack by Eve
requires that she be able to compute an authentication tag for a message. This is known as
forging an authentication tag.
If Eve was somehow able to obtain knowledge of the key k, she could clearly forge an
authentication tag for any message she wanted. The only secret information contained in the
computation of the authentication tag is the key. All the specifications for the MAC, the
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message m, and the quasigroup (Q, ◦) are made public. Therefore, if Eve has the key, she can
compute authentication tags in the same way as Alice and Bob.
However, it is also possible that Eve might be able to forge authentication tags even without
knowledge of the key k. If she sees enough message/authentication pairs pass between Alice
and Bob, she may be able to gain information about how to compute the authentication tag
without knowledge of the key. Therefore, we need to make sure that a MAC is secure against
this possibility as well.
Before discussing the types of forgeries that Eve can compute, we need to talk about what
sort of abilities Eve has. That is, we would like to know what type of attack Eve is capable
of. There are several types of forgeries, or attacks, that Eve can attempt. In each of the
attacks described in this section, we assume that Eve has access to an oracle which models
the behavior of hk for some fixed (but arbitrary) value of k. That is, if Eve inputs xi, the
oracle responds with hk(xi). Basically, this implies that for a message xi, Eve is allowed to see
the authentication tag associated with this message. The type of attack that Eve can mount
depends on how much control she has over the values of xi. There are several different kinds
of attacks that Eve could attempt.
• A known-text attack is an attack where Eve has a certain number of message-authentication
tag pairs (xi, hk(xi)), but she has no control over what these pairs are. That is, Eve is
allowed to use the oracle to compute hk(xi), but she is not allowed to choose the values
of xi.
• A chosen-text attack is an attack where Eve has a certain number of message-authentication
tag pairs (xi, hk(xi)), and she is allowed to choose the values of xi. However, she must
choose all of the values of xi before she starts using the oracle to compute hk(xi).
• An adaptive chosen-text attack is an attack where Eve has a certain number of
message-authentication tag pairs (xi, hk(xi)), and she is allowed to choose the value of xi
based on the results of previous queries to the oracle. That is, Eve chooses x1 and uses
the oracle to compute hk(x1). Based on this result, she chooses x2 and uses the oracle
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to compute hk(x2). This process continues for as many calls as Eve is allowed to make
to the oracle.
Clearly, an adaptive chosen-text attack gives Eve the most power. She can analyze previous
message-authentication tag pairs and then use this information to try to guess the value of
the key or to try to forge an authentication tag. However, notice that this situation may not
always be allowed by the oracle. Perhaps the oracle takes a list of inputs and produces a list
of outputs, and Eve is only allowed to input one list of messages to the oracle. This situation
would only allow for a chosen-text attack, not an adaptive chosen-text attack.
In (9), Preneel requires that a MAC needs to be able to withstand an adaptive chosen-text
attack regardless of whether or not such an attack is possible. This requirement ensures that a
MAC will be secure against the “worst” kind of attack—that is, the type of attack in which the
attacker can get the most information about how a MAC-value is computed from a message.
Notice that if a MAC is secure against an adaptive chosen-text attack, it will also be secure
against a chosen-text attack and a known-text attack. Therefore, if QMAC is secure against
an adaptive chosen-text attack, it achieves the highest level of security desired.
The security of QMAC rests on the non-associativity of the quasigroup (Q, ◦). Clearly, if
(Q, ◦) is associative, then for a block m1, . . . ,mt, every key k will produce exactly the same
value of hk(m1, . . . ,mt). Therefore, in order to make QMAC more secure, we would like (Q, ◦)
to be a “highly non-associative” quasigroup. Methods for measuring “how non-associative” a
quasigroup is and for constructing such quasigroups are discussed in Chapter 5. In addition, it
appears that the more structure (Q, ◦) has (for example, having an identity element or being
commutative), the more the security of QMAC is in question. It is possible that an attacker
may be able to use the structure present in (Q, ◦) to assist in forging a MAC-value without
knowledge of the key. Also, Q needs to be a large quasigroup in order to reduce the probability
of an attacker finding a collision by randomly guessing a value of hk(m1, . . . ,mt). In addition,
the size of the keyspace increases linearly as the size of (Q, ◦) increases. Beyond these two
relationships, it is not entirely clear what impact the size of (Q, ◦) has on the security of
QMAC. Practical methods for constructing large quasigroups are discussed in Chapter 4.
22
Many of the MACs that have been discussed in the literature are based on other crypto-
graphic primitives, such as block ciphers or hash functions. A proof of security (if one is given
at all) usually rests on the assumption that the underlying primitive is secure. Since QMAC
is not based on a familiar primitive, it is unclear how to even formulate basic questions about
its security and how to determine whether it is secure against an adaptive chosen-text attack.
It would seem more natural to define hk without the inclusion of the constant c ∈ Q (see
Definition 5). However, it turns out that there is a chosen-text attack on that scheme, as
we now show. Suppose our key k is simply a parenthesis scheme on x1, . . . xt. According to
Definition 3, Eve is allowed to ask the oracle for the values of hk(m1, . . . ,mt) for several inputs
of her choosing.
Eve first chooses any message and asks for hk(m1, . . . ,mt) = z. Then for each value of
j = 1, 2, . . . , t−1, she chooses elements m′j , m′j+1 so that mj 6= m′j and m′j ◦m′j+1 = mj ◦mj+1.
Notice that this is always possible by the second condition of Definition 1. Eve then requests
the value
wj = hk(. . . ,mj−1,m′j ,m
′
j+1,mj+2, . . . ).
If (xi ◦xi+1) is an innermost product of k, then wi = z. Once such an i has been found, Eve is
able to compute the values of hk(. . . ,mi−1, u, v,mi+2, . . . ) = z for any value of u by choosing
v so that u◦v = mi ◦mi+1. It may not be possible for Eve to forge authentication tags for any
meaningful messages, but the fact that she can forge authentication tags violates the security
requirements for a MAC.
The inclusion of the constant c in Definition 5 serves to hide the position of the innermost
products. Notice that if the quasigroup contains an identity element, 1, then the value of
hk(1, 1, 1, . . . , 1) will return some non-associated power of c. This does not seem to expose the
value of c, but it is probably prudent to avoid quasigroups with an identity element.
Besides this technique, we currently know of no other attacks on QMAC. Note that this
does not imply that QMAC is secure. It simply implies that at this time, no successful attacks
against QMAC have been found. The best approach to determining whether QMAC is secure
appears to be to design potential attacks and determine if they will succeed. If an attack is
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successful, then the specifications of QMAC will need to be changed in order to guard against
that attack.
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CHAPTER 4. METHODS OF CONSTRUCTING LARGE
QUASIGROUPS
In order to be able to practically use QMAC, we need to look at the underlying quasigroup.
Recall that (Q, ◦) is not part of the secret key, so we do not need to discuss how Alice and Bob
can exchange (Q, ◦). However, we do need to consider what properties (Q, ◦) needs to have.
There are two key properties that are required: that (Q, ◦) is “large” and that it is “highly
non-associative”. Chapter 4 will deal with methods for creating and storing large quasigroups,
and Chapter 5 will discuss issues associated with the non-associativity of the quasigroups.
In order to partially ensure QMAC’s security, we need to work with quasigroups of large
order. If (Q, ◦) is small, it would be relatively easy for an attacker to find a collision for
hk, even without the key, because there would only be a small number of authentication tags
available. Even if Eve does not know the key, she could still choose a random authentication
tag for a message and have a good chance that it matches the actual authentication tag, thus
succeeding in compromising the security of QMAC.
Because we will be working with quasigroups of large order, it is computationally infeasible
(both in terms of space and in terms of time) to store the entire quasigroup and perform
multiplication by a table lookup. This implies that we need to find a more efficient method for
representing quasigroups of large order and performing multiplication within these quasigroups.
In this chapter, methods will be discussed which address this problem.
4.1 Isotopies
One common way of creating quasigroups is through isotopies. The following definition is
taken from (3).
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Definition 6. Let (Q1, ◦) and (Q2, ?) be two quasigroups. Q1 and Q2 are isotopic if there
are bijections f, g, h : Q1 → Q2 so that f(x ◦ y) = g(x) ? h(y) for all x, y ∈ Q1. The ordered
triple (f, g, h) is called an isotopy.
Notice that an isotopy can be used to create a quasigroup (Q, ?) from another quasigroup
(Q, ◦) by defining
x ? y = f−1 (g(x) ◦ h(y))
for x, y ∈ Q.
Claim. If (Q, ?) is created from (Q, ◦) as described above, then (Q, ?) is a quasigroup.
Proof. Clearly, Q is closed under ?. Therefore, we just need to show that (Q, ?) has unique
solubility of equations. This can be done by showing that La(x) = a ? x and Ra(x) = x ? a are
permutations, for all a ∈ Q.
First, show that La(x) is one-to-one for some arbitrary a ∈ Q. Assume that La(x) = La(y)
and show that x = y. Notice that because f is a bijection, f−1 is also a bijection. In addition,
h is a bijection, so we have
La(x) = La(y)
a ? x = a ? y
f−1 (g(a) ◦ h(x)) = f−1 (g(a) ◦ h(y))
g(a) ◦ h(x) = g(a) ◦ h(y)
h(x) = h(y)
x = y
Next, show that La(x) is onto. Let y ∈ Q. We need to find x ∈ Q so that La(x) = y.
Because (Q, ◦) is a quasigroup, there is some z ∈ Q so that g(a) ◦ z = f(y). Because h is a
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bijection, h is onto, so there is some x ∈ Q so that h(x) = z, or x = h−1(z). Then we have
La(x) = a ? x
= f−1 (g(a) ◦ h(x))
= f−1
(
g(a) ◦ h(h−1(z)))
= f−1 (g(a) ◦ z)
= f−1(f(y))
= y
Hence La(x) is a permutation on (Q, ?). By symmetry, we can also see that Ra(x) is also
a permutation on (Q, ?). This implies that (Q, ?) is a quasigroup.
Example 5. Let (Q, ◦) = (Z4,+) where Z4 = {0, 1, 2, 3} and addition is computed modulo 4,
so that the Cayley table for (Q, ◦) is given in Figure 4.1. Let the isotopy (f, g, h) be as shown
in Figure 4.2.
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 2 3 0
2 2 3 0 1
3 3 0 1 2
Figure 4.1 The Cayley table for (Q, ◦)
x f(x) g(x) h(x)
0 1 2 3
1 0 3 1
2 3 1 0
3 2 0 2
Figure 4.2 The isotopy (f, g, h)
Then the quasigroup (Q, ?) is produced and its Cayley table is given in Figure 4.3. Notice
that although (Q, ◦) is a group, (Q, ?) is neither associative nor commutative and has no
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identity element.
Q =
? 0 1 2 3
0 0 2 3 1
1 3 1 2 0
2 1 3 0 2
3 2 0 1 3
Figure 4.3 The Cayley table for (Q, ?)
Normally when we are working with isotopies, we will choose f to be the identity map, so
that a quasigroup operation is defined by
x ? y = g(x) ◦ h(y).
4.1.1 Affine Isotopies
If the isotopies that we choose have special properties, then the quasigroup which is created
by the isotopy will also have special properties. In particular, (Q, ◦) has special properties if
our isotopies are linear or affine maps.
Definition 7. Let (Q,+) be a group and let f : Q → Q. f is a linear map if f(x + y) =
f(x)+ f(y) for all x, y ∈ Q. f is an affine map if f(x+ y) = f(x)+ f(y)− f(0), where 0 ∈ Q
denotes the identity element under +.
Notice that an affine map requires both an identity element and inverse elements, so we
must start with a group in order to have the concept of an affine map well-defined. Therefore,
in this section, we will always create a quasigroup (Q, ◦) from a group (Q,+).
Example 6. Let Q = Z8 = {0, 1, . . . , 7} and let the group operation be addition modulo
8. Then we can create a quasigroup (Q, ◦) from (Z8,+) by isotopy, with f(x) = 3x + 4 and
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g(x) = 5x+ 1. Notice that f and g are affine, because
f(x+ y) = 3(x+ y) + 4
= 3x+ 3y + 4
= (3x+ 4) + (3x+ 4)− 4
= f(x) + f(y)− f(0)
and
g(x+ y) = 5(x+ y) + 1
= 5x+ 5y + 1
= (5x+ 1) + (5y + 1)− 1
= g(x) + g(y)− g(0)
Since we are creating (Q, ◦) by isotopy, we will define
x ◦ y = f(x) + g(y)
for x, y ∈ Z8. Then (Q, ◦) is shown in Figure 4.4, where Q = Z8.
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 5 2 7 4 1 6 3 0
1 0 5 2 7 4 1 6 3
2 3 0 5 2 7 4 1 6
3 6 3 0 5 2 7 4 1
4 1 6 3 0 5 2 7 4
5 4 1 6 3 0 5 2 7
6 7 4 1 6 3 0 5 2
7 2 7 4 1 6 3 0 5
Figure 4.4 The Cayley table for (Z8, ◦)
Notice that (Q, ◦) is not associative, because (0◦2)◦4 = 7◦4 = 6 but 0◦ (2◦4) = 0◦7 = 0.
It is not commutative, because 0 ◦ 1 = 2 but 1 ◦ 0 = 0. There is no identity element and
hence no inverses. However, (Q, ◦) is still quite structured—the elements in each row always
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appear in the same order, and the elements in each column are also arranged in the same
order. In addition, each row is a copy of the previous row, shifted one space to the right. Each
column is a copy of the previous column, shifted one space down. These properties hold for
any quasigroup created by affine isotopies and will be formally stated in Properties 1 and 2.
However, these properties are easier to see in a quasigroup created from (Q,+), where Q is a
group of exponent 2 (that is, for any x ∈ Q, x+x = 0, where 0 ∈ Q denotes the group identity
element). Therefore, consider the following example.
Example 7. Let Q = Z32 = {〈x2, x1, x0〉 : xi ∈ Z2 for i = 0, 1, 2} and let the group operation
on Q be exclusive-or, denoted by ⊕. This implies that (Q,⊕) has exponent 2, because x⊕x =
〈0, 0, 0〉 for all x ∈ Q. Then we can create a quasigroup (Q, ◦) from (Z32,⊕) by choosing two
affine maps f and g, where f, g : Z32 → Z32 are bijections. Let
f(〈x2, x1, x0〉) = 〈x1, x0, x2〉
and let
g(〈x2, x1, x0) = 〈x2 ⊕ x1, x0, x2 ⊕ 1〉
Then f is affine, because
f(〈x2, x1, x0〉 ⊕ 〈y2, y1, y0〉) = f(〈x2 ⊕ y2, x1,⊕y1, x0 ⊕ y0〉)
= 〈x1 ⊕ y1, x0 ⊕ y0, x2 ⊕ y2〉
= 〈x1, x0, x2〉 ⊕ 〈y1, y0, y2〉
= f(〈x2, x1, x0〉)⊕ f(〈y2, y1, y0〉)⊕ f(〈0, 0, 0〉)
g is also affine, because
g(〈x2, x1, x0〉 ⊕ 〈y2, y1, y0〉) = g(〈x2 ⊕ y2, x1 ⊕ y1, x0 ⊕ y0〉)
= 〈x2 ⊕ y2 ⊕ x1 ⊕ y1, x0 ⊕ y0, x2 ⊕ y2 ⊕ 1〉
= 〈x2 ⊕ x1, x0, x2 ⊕ 1〉 ⊕ 〈y2 ⊕ y1, y0, y2 ⊕ 1〉 ⊕ 〈0, 0, 1〉
= g(〈x2, x1, x0〉)⊕ g(〈y2, y1, y0〉)⊕ g(〈0, 0, 0〉)
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For ease of notation, we will represent the group element 〈x2, x1, x0〉 by the integer x to
which 〈x2, x1, x0〉 corresponds if x is written in binary. (For example, we would denote the
string 〈0, 1, 0〉 by the integer 2.) If we define x◦y = f(x)⊕g(y), then (Q, ◦) is shown in Figure
4.5.
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 3 5 7 0 2 4 6
1 3 1 7 5 2 0 6 4
2 5 7 1 3 4 6 0 2
3 7 5 3 1 6 4 2 0
4 0 2 4 6 1 3 5 7
5 2 0 6 4 3 1 7 5
6 4 6 0 2 5 7 1 3
7 6 4 2 0 7 5 3 1
Figure 4.5 The Cayley table for
(
Z32, ◦
)
Notice that (Q, ◦) created in Example 7 is not associative, because 0 ◦ (2 ◦ 4) = 0 ◦ 4 = 0
but (0◦2)◦4 = 5◦4 = 3. It is commutative, but this property does not need to hold in general
for a quasigroup created in this way. There is no identity element and hence no inverses.
However, there are definite “pairing” properties present. For example, the elements 1 and 3
always appear next to each other in rows and columns, so we say they are “paired”. Similarly,
5 and 7 are paired, and so on. These element pairing properties in rows and columns are
defined more generally in Definitions 8 and 9.
Definition 8. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup and let a, b, k, x, y ∈ Q. Assume that:
• a appears in row x, column y.
• b appears in row x, column y + k.
Then elements a and b are row paired over k if whenever a appears in row z, column w, b
appears in row z, column w + k, for any z, w ∈ Q.
Definition 9. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup and let a, b, k, x, y ∈ Q. Assume that:
• a appears in row x, column y.
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• b appears in row x+ k, column y.
Then elements a and b are column paired over k if whenever a appears in row z, column w,
b appears in row z + k, column w, for any z, w ∈ Q.
In any quasigroup (Q, ◦) created from (Q,+) by affine isotopies, these pairing properties
always hold. That is, for any a, b, k, x, y ∈ Q, if a appears in row x, column y and b appears
in row x, column y + k, then a and b are row paired over k. Similarly, if a appears in row x,
column y and b appears in row x+ k, column y, then a and b are column paired over k. This
pairing property is made more precise in Property 1.
Property 1. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup created from the group (Q,+) by
x ◦ y = f(x) + g(y) for x, y ∈ Q
where f, g : Q→ Q are bijective affine maps. Then
x ◦ y = z ◦ w ⇒ x ◦ (y + k) = z ◦ (w + k) (4.1)
and
x ◦ y = z ◦ w ⇒ (x+ k) ◦ y = (z + k) ◦ w (4.2)
for any x, y, z, w, k ∈ Q.
Proof. Only (4.1) will be proved, the proof of (4.2) is similar. We have
x ◦ y = z ◦ w
f(x) + g(y) = f(z) + g(w)
f(x) + g(y) + g(k)− g(0) = f(z) + g(w) + g(k)− g(0)
f(x) + g(y + k) = f(z) + g(w + k)
x ◦ (y + k) = z ◦ (w + k)
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Another “pairing” property that can be seen in (Z32, ◦) in Figure 4.5 is the pairing of entire
rows and columns. For example, notice that row 0 read from left to right and row 7 read from
right to left are exactly the same sequence of elements from Z32. This holds true for every row
in (Z32, ◦)—each row is the reversal of another row in (Z32, ◦). Another type of row pairing is
the reversal of elements in columns for two given rows. For example, row 0 and row 1 have
every pair of elements reversed. (That is, row 0 has 1 3 5 7 · · · and row 1 has 3 1 5 7 · · · .)
Each row in (Z32, ◦) is paired with another row in this way. The same pairing properties hold
for columns—for example, columns 0 and 7 are paired in the first sense, and columns 0 and
1 are paired in the second sense. These row and column pairing properties are defined more
generally in Definitions 10 and 11.
Definition 10. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup and let k, x, y ∈ Q. Rows x and y are paired over
k if for any a, z ∈ Q, whenever a appears in row x, column z, a also appears in row y, column
z + k.
Definition 11. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup and let k, x, y ∈ Q. Columns x and y are paired
over k if for any a, z ∈ Q, whenever a appears in row z, column x, a also appears in row z+k,
column y.
There are two natural questions that exist. First, given a quasigroup (Q, ◦) and a row or
column x, is there a row or column y with which x is paired over k? Second, assuming that
row or column x has such a pair, what is the value of y? If our quasigroup is created by using
affine isotopies, the answer to the first question is yes and the second question is answered in
Property 2.
Property 2. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup created from the group (Q,+) by
x ◦ y = f(x) + g(y) for x, y ∈ Q
where f, g : Q→ Q are bijective affine maps. Then rows x and y are paired over k if and only
if x ◦ 0 = y ◦ k, where 0 ∈ Q denotes the group identity element. That is, for any z ∈ Q,
x ◦ z = y ◦ (z + k)⇔ x ◦ 0 = y ◦ k (4.3)
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Notice that for x, k ∈ Q, y is guaranteed to exist because of unique solubility of equations in
a quasigroup.
Similarly, columns x and y are paired over k if and only if 0◦x = k ◦y. That is, for any z ∈ Q,
z ◦ x = (z + k) ◦ y ⇔ 0 ◦ x = k ◦ y (4.4)
Again, notice that y is guaranteed to exist.
Proof. Only (4.3) will be proved; the proof of (4.4) is similar.
⇒ Assume that x ◦ z = y ◦ (z + k). Then we have
f(x) + g(z) = f(y) + g(z + k)
f(x) + g(z) = f(y) + g(z) + g(k)− g(0)
f(x) = f(y) + g(k)− g(0)
f(x) + g(0) = f(y) + g(k)
x ◦ 0 = y ◦ k
⇐ Assume that x ◦ 0 = y ◦ k. Then we have
f(x) + g(0) = f(y) + g(k)
f(x) = f(y) + g(k)− g(0)
f(x) + g(z) = f(y) + g(z) + g(k)− g(0)
f(x) + g(z) = f(y) + g(z + k)
x ◦ z = y ◦ (z + k)
4.1.2 Non-affine Isotopies
It is also possible to create a quasigroup using isotopies that are not affine maps. In
this case, none of the properties discussed in Section 4.1.1 are required to hold, as shown in
Example 8.
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x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f(x) 1 4 6 3 2 7 0 5
g(x) 4 2 1 0 6 5 7 3
Figure 4.6 Non-affine isotopies f and g
Example 8. Let Q = Z8 as defined in Example 6 and let the group operation on Q be addition
modulo 8. Let f, g : Q→ Q be as in Figure 4.6.
Notice that both f and g are non-affine bijections, because
f(1 + 3) = f(4) = 2 but f(1) + f(3)− f(0) = 4 + 3− 1 = 6
and
g(2 + 4) = g(6) = 7 but g(2) + g(4)− g(0) = 1 + 6− 4 = 3.
If a quasigroup (Q, ◦) is created by isotopy from f and g (so x ◦ y = f(x) + g(y)), then (Q, ◦)
is shown in Figure 4.7.
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 5 3 2 1 7 6 0 4
1 0 6 5 4 2 1 3 7
2 2 0 7 6 4 3 5 1
3 7 5 4 3 1 0 2 6
4 6 4 3 2 0 7 1 5
5 3 1 0 7 5 4 6 2
6 4 2 1 0 6 5 7 3
7 1 7 6 5 3 2 4 0
Figure 4.7 The Cayley table for (Q, ◦) created from a non-affine isotopy
Notice that (Q, ◦) does not have any of the pairing properties defined in Section 4.1.1. For
example, 3 and 2 are adjacent to each other in row 0, but this does not happen in row 1.
The elements 5 and 0 are adjacent to each other in column 0, but not in column 1. A similar
analysis shows that none of the pairing properties hold.
However, even though none of these pairing properties hold, there are still other properties
present in a quasigroup (Q, ◦) created by isotopy from an abelian group. One such property
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is described in Property 3.
Property 3. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup created from an abelian group (Q,+) by
x ◦ y = f(x) + g(y) for x, y ∈ Q
where f, g : Q→ Q are bijections. Then
a ◦ c = x
a ◦ d = x+ z
b ◦ c = y
 =⇒ b ◦ d = y + z
Proof. By the definition of x ◦ y, we can see that the following equations are true.
f(a) + g(c) = x
f(a) + g(d) = x+ z ⇒ g(d) = x+ z − f(a)
f(b) + g(c) = y ⇒ f(b) = y − g(c)
Therefore,
b ◦ d = f(b) + g(d)
= y − g(c) + x+ z − f(a)
= y + z + x− f(a)− g(c)
= y + z, as desired.
Example 9. Let Q = Z16 where addition is computed modulo 16, and let f, g : Q → Q be
given in Figure 4.8.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
f(x) 1 6 9 15 0 7 8 14 3 4 11 13 2 5 10 12
g(x) 3 15 5 4 2 11 12 13 9 6 0 14 7 10 1 8
Figure 4.8 Isotopies f and g
Then the quasigroup (Q, ◦) created from f and g by isotopy is shown in Figure 4.9. We can
see that the relationship described in Property 3 is present in (Q, ◦), as required. For example,
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Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 4 0 6 5 3 12 13 14 10 7 1 15 8 11 2 9
1 9 5 11 10 8 1 2 3 15 12 6 4 13 0 7 14
2 12 8 14 13 11 4 5 6 2 15 9 7 0 3 10 1
3 2 14 4 3 1 10 11 12 8 5 15 13 6 9 0 7
4 3 15 5 4 2 11 12 13 9 6 0 14 7 10 1 8
5 10 6 12 11 9 2 3 4 0 13 7 5 14 1 8 15
6 11 7 13 12 10 3 4 5 1 14 8 6 15 2 9 0
7 1 13 3 2 0 9 10 11 7 4 14 12 5 8 15 6
8 6 2 8 7 5 14 15 0 12 9 3 1 10 13 4 11
9 7 3 9 8 6 15 0 1 13 10 4 2 11 14 5 12
10 14 10 0 15 13 6 7 8 4 1 11 9 2 5 12 3
11 0 12 2 1 15 8 9 10 6 3 13 11 4 7 14 5
12 5 1 7 6 4 13 14 15 11 8 2 0 9 12 3 10
13 8 4 10 9 7 0 1 2 14 11 5 3 12 15 6 13
14 13 9 15 14 12 5 6 7 3 0 10 8 1 4 11 2
15 15 11 1 0 14 7 8 9 5 2 12 10 3 6 13 4
Figure 4.9 The Cayley table for (Z16, ◦) created by isotopy from (Z16,+)
notice that 5 ◦ 4 = 9, 5 ◦ 8 = 0, and 15 ◦ 4 = 14. In the notation of Property 3, this indicates
that x = 9, z = 7, and y = 14. Therefore, we must also have 15 ◦ 8 = 14 + 7 = 5.
If we use the quasigroup (Q, ◦) created by isotopy from (Zk2,⊕), then Property 3 can be
restated in a simpler form. Because ⊕ is its own inverse operation, we can move elements from
one side of an equation to the other without needing to negate the element. This gives us the
following property for (Zk2,⊕).
Property 4. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup created from the group (Zk2,⊕) by
x ◦ y = f(x)⊕ g(y) for x, y ∈ Q
where f, g : Zk2 → Zk2 are bijections. Then
a ◦ c = b ◦ d⇔ a ◦ d = b ◦ c for a, b, c, d ∈ Q.
Proof. ⇒ Assume a ◦ c = b ◦ d. Then we have
f(a)⊕ g(c) = f(b)⊕ g(d)
f(a)⊕ g(d) = f(b)⊕ g(c)
a ◦ d = b ◦ c
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The reverse implication follows immediately.
Example 10. Let f, g : Z42 → Z42 be the same as in Example 9, where elements of Z42 are
represented as integers for ease of notation. The quasigroup (Q, ◦) created from f and g by
isotopy is shown in Figure 4.10.
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 2 14 4 5 3 10 13 12 8 7 1 15 6 11 0 9
1 5 9 3 2 4 13 10 11 15 0 6 8 1 12 7 14
2 10 6 12 13 11 2 5 4 0 15 9 7 14 3 8 1
3 12 0 10 11 13 4 3 2 6 9 15 1 8 5 14 7
4 3 15 5 4 2 11 12 13 9 6 0 14 7 10 1 8
5 4 8 2 3 5 12 11 10 14 1 7 9 0 13 6 15
6 11 7 13 12 10 3 4 5 1 14 8 6 15 2 9 0
7 13 1 11 10 12 5 2 3 7 8 14 0 9 4 15 6
8 0 12 6 7 1 8 15 14 10 5 3 13 4 9 2 11
9 7 11 1 0 6 15 8 9 13 2 4 10 3 14 5 12
10 8 4 14 15 9 0 7 6 2 13 11 5 12 1 10 3
11 14 2 8 9 15 6 1 0 4 11 13 3 10 7 12 5
12 1 13 7 6 0 9 14 15 11 4 2 12 5 8 3 10
13 6 10 0 1 7 14 9 8 12 3 5 11 2 15 4 13
14 9 5 15 14 8 1 6 7 3 12 10 4 13 0 11 2
15 15 3 9 8 14 7 0 1 5 10 12 2 11 6 13 4
Figure 4.10 The Cayley table for (Z42, ◦) created from non-affine isotopies
Notice that both f and g are non-affine bijections, because
f(2⊕ 9) = f(11) = 13 but f(2)⊕ f(9)⊕ f(0) = 9⊕ 4⊕ 1 = 12
and
g(2⊕ 9) = g(11) = 14 but g(2)⊕ g(9)⊕ g(0) = 5⊕ 6⊕ 3 = 0.
However, as shown in Figure 4.10, (Z42, ◦) has the pairing described in Property 4. For
example, notice that 5 ◦ 4 = 5, 5 ◦ 8 = 14, and 15 ◦ 4 = 14. Therefore, we must also have
15 ◦ 8 = 5.
It is not clear whether these pairing properties pose security risks for QMAC. Because the
secret key is the parenthesis scheme and the quasigroup is public information in QMAC, Eve
does not need to utilize structure present in (Q, ◦) to try and generate the quasigroup. However,
this structure may give Eve a foothold for forging authentication tags without knowledge of
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the key. Therefore, although we have no explicit reason for doing so, it may be wise to avoid
quasigroups generated by affine isotopies and by isotopy from abelian groups. It appears that
creating a quasigroups from a non-abelian group by isotopy may be a viable option, but more
research is needed on this topic.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, quasigroups of large order are required
in order to create a secure MAC. If isotopies are used to create such a quasigroup, the only
information that needs to be stored are the maps f and g, along with the group (Q,+) that
is used to generate the quasigroup (Q, ◦). This is a significant improvement over storing the
entire quasigroup and performing multiplication by a table lookup. However, if we could create
a quasigroup using only one map instead of two, we would need even less storage space. Using
only one map would also improve the time considerations, because the image of x ∈ Q would
only need to be computed under one map instead of under two. Section 4.2 develops this idea.
4.2 Complete Mappings
One way that a quasigroup can be created from a group using only one map uses a special
kind of mapping called a complete mapping.
Definition 12. Let (G,+) be a group and let i : G → G denote the identity map on G.
θ : G→ G is a complete mapping if
• θ is a bijection and
• i− θ is a bijection, where (i− θ)(x) = x− θ(x).
Example 11. Let (G,+) = (Z9,+), where Z9 = {0, 1, . . . , 8} and addition is performed
modulo 9. Then θ(x) = 5x+ 3 is a complete mapping as seen in Figure 4.11, because both θ
and i− θ are bijections.
Before using complete maps to generate quasigroups, it would be helpful to know whether
or not a group G has a complete map. This is a subject that has been extensively studied. A
few key results are presented in Section 4.2.1.
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x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
θ(x) 3 8 4 0 5 1 6 2 7
x− θ(x) 6 2 7 3 8 4 0 5 1
Figure 4.11 A complete mapping on Z9
4.2.1 Admissible Groups
Definition 13. Let G be a group. G is admissible if there is a complete map θ : G→ G.
As mentioned previously, QMAC requires using a large quasigroup. In addition, because
much of cryptography deals with binary strings, it would be convenient to create a quasigroup
from a group G of order 2m. Unfortunately, many of these groups are inadmissible. We first
prove in Proposition 1 that if a group G has a subgroup of odd order and index 2, then G is
not admissible.
Proposition 1. Let G be a group with |G| = 2m, where m is odd. If G has a subgroup of
order m, then G is not admissible.
Proof. Let N ≤ G be the subgroup of order m. Consider the cosets N and G −N of G. For
ease of notation, call these cosets C1 and C2. Notice that |C1| = |C2| = m. We first show
that if both θ(x) and (i− θ)(x) are permutations, then exactly half of the elements of G must
be mapped back to their original coset by θ. Because (i− θ)(x) = x− θ(x) is a permutation,
we must have x − θ(x) ∈ C1 exactly half the time and x − θ(x) ∈ C2 exactly half the time.
Because C1 is a subgroup of G, in order to have x−θ(x) ∈ C1, we need x and θ(x) to be in the
same coset. Hence we need θ to map exactly half of the elements of G back to their original
coset. That is, we need θ to map x back to its original coset exactly m times.
Now we show that if n = 2m, where m is odd, then it is impossible for exactly half the
elements of G to be mapped back to their original coset by θ. Define the following quantities:
k = number of elements from C1 mapped back into C1 by θ
j = number of elements from C2 mapped back into C2 by θ
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Because exactly half of the elements of G must be mapped back into their original coset, we
must have k + j = m. In addition, observe that
m− k = number of elements from C1 mapped into C2 by θ
m− j = number of elements from C2 mapped into C1 by θ
However, because k elements have already been mapped into C1, there must be m − k spots
left for elements. But we know that there are m − j elements that are also mapped into C1,
so therefore we must have m− k = m− j, or k = j. However, we also have k + j = m; hence
2k = m. But m was odd, so this is a contradiction. Therefore, there is no map θ : G→ G so
that both θ and i− θ are permutations when |G| = 2m where m is odd and G has a subgroup
of order m.
The next proposition is a slight modification of a result presented in (8). Paige proves that
if (G,+) is an abelian group with exactly one element of order 2, then there is no mapping
θ : G→ G so that both θ and i+θ are bijections. In addition, the converse is also proved, which
enables us to easily determine whether or not a finite abelian group is admissible. Because our
definition of admissible requires θ and i − θ to be bijections, small changes are made in the
proof. The following notation is used:
• G is a finite abelian group where |G| = n. G is written multiplicatively.
• θ : G→ G is a 1-1 mapping.
• η : G→ G is defined by η(x) := xθ(x)−1.
• The order of η (that is, the number of distinct elements η(x), for x ∈ G), is O(η).
Notice that G is admissible if and only if η is 1-1.
Proposition 2. If G has exactly one element of order 2, then G is not admissible, but there
is some θ : G→ G so that O(η) = n− 1.
If G does not have exactly one element of order 2, then G is admissible.
Proof. We need several lemmas and corollaries in order to prove Proposition 2.
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Lemma 1. If G has exactly one element of order 2 (call this element x), then
∏
g∈G g = x. If
G does not have exactly one element of order 2, then
∏
g∈G g = 1.
Proof. For ease of notation, let G = {1, g1, g2, . . . , gn−1}. Consider the following cases.
Case 1: G contains no elements of order 2. Then for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1, gi 6= g−1i . That is,
each non-identity element in G has a unique inverse element where the element and its inverse
are not equal. Because G is abelian, this implies
∏
g∈G
g = 1 · g1 · g2 · · · gn = 1 · g1 · g−11 · · · gi · g−1i = 1
and hence
∏
g∈G g = 1.
Case 2: G contains exactly one element of order 2. Without loss of generality, assume that
this element is g1. Then g1 = g−11 and for all i = 2, . . . , n− 1, we have gi 6= g−1i . This implies∏
g∈G
g = g1 · 1 · g2 · g−12 · · · gi · g−1i = g1 · 1 = g1
and hence
∏
g∈G g = g1.
Case 3: G contains more than one element of order 2. Let B = {g ∈ G : |g| = 2}. Decompose
G into a direct product of subgroups as follows:
G ∼= A1 ×A2 × · · · ×Ak ×A,
where Ai = 〈ai〉 for i = 1, . . . , k, |ai| = 2mi for mi ∈ N, and 2 - |A|. This implies that each Ai
has a unique element of order 2. Call this element bi. Because G has more than one element
of order 2, we know that k > 1.
Let g = 〈g1, g2, . . . , gk, h〉 ∈ A1 × · · · × Ak × A have order 2. Then g2i = 1 for i = 1, . . . , k
and h2 = 1. Because 2 - |A|, 2 - |h| and so h = 1. Because g21 = 1, we know that gi ∈ {bi, 1}
for i = 1, . . . , k. Therefore, g = 〈bα11 , bα22 , . . . , bαkk , 1〉, where αi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , k. Notice
that we cannot have α1 = α2 = · · · = αk = 0 because then g = 〈1, 1, . . . , 1〉, which does not
have order 2.
In order to evaluate
∏
g∈B g, we can evaluate the product of all the elements of order 2
from A1 × · · · × Ak × A. From above, all these elements must have the form 〈bα11 , . . . , bαkk , 1〉
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where α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ {0, 1}k − 〈0, . . . , 0〉. Therefore, we need to evaluate the product over
all possible values of α. That is,
∏
g∈B
g ∼=
∏
α∈{0,1}k−〈0,...,0〉
〈bα11 , . . . , bαkk , 1〉.
Notice that bi will appear in the ith component of this product only when αi = 1. This
happens in exactly 2k−1 values of α, so bi will appear in the ith component of the product 2k−1
times. Because k > 1, bi will appear in the ith component of the product an even number of
times. Since |bi| = 2, the ith component of the product is 1.
Therefore, ∏
g∈B
g ∼=
∏
α
〈bα1i , . . . , bαkk , 1〉 = 〈1, . . . , 1, 1〉
and so
∏
g∈B g = 1.
Finally, because each element in G − B has a unique inverse element where the element
and its inverse are not equal, we can easily see that
∏
g∈G−B g = 1. Hence∏
g∈G
g =
∏
g∈B
g
∏
g∈G−B
g = 1 · 1 = 1.
Lemma 2. If O(η) = n, then
∏
g∈G
g = 1.
Proof. Assume that there is a 1-1 map θ : G → G so that O(η) = n. Let G = {x1, . . . , xn}.
Then we have the following:
n∏
i=1
η(xi) =
n∏
i=1
xiθ(xi)−1
=
n∏
i=1
xi
n∏
x=1
θ(xi)−1
Because θ and η are 1-1 maps,
n∏
i=1
θ(xi)−1 =
n∏
i=1
η(xi) =
n∏
i=1
xi
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Let p =
n∏
i=1
xi. Then
p · p = p⇒ p = 1
as desired.
Corollary 1. If
∏
g∈G
g 6= 1, then O(η) < n for all θ : G→ G.
Corollary 2. If G has exactly one element of order 2, then G is not admissible.
Proof. By Lemma 2, we know that if G has exactly one element of order 2, then
∏
g∈G g 6= 1.
By Corollary 1, if
∏
g∈G g 6= 1, then O(η) < n for all θ : G → G. Therefore, there is no 1-1
map θ so that η is also 1-1. Hence G is not admissible.
Notice that this proves half of the main proposition, so now we just need to show that if
G does not have exactly one element of order 2, then G is admissible.
Lemma 3. If O(η) ≤ n − 2 for some 1-1 map θ : G → G, then there is another 1-1 map
θ′ : G→ G so that O(η′) > O(η).
Proof. Let θ be a mapping where O(η) = r ≤ n− 2. Let {η(xi)|i = 1, . . . , r} be the r distinct
images of η in G.
Case (1): There are h, k > r so that xhθ(xk)−1 is not in the range of η. Then define θ′ by
θ′(xh) = θ(xk) (4.5)
θ′(xk) = θ(xh)
θ′(xi) = θ(xi) for i 6= h, k (4.6)
We need to show that O(η′) > O(η). First, notice that
η′(xi) = xiθ′(xi)−1 = xiθ(xi)−1 = η(xi) for i = 1, . . . , r, by (4.6).
Therefore, O(η′) ≥ O(η). In addition,
η′(xh) = xhθ′(xh)−1 = xhθ(xk)−1 by (4.5)
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which is not in the range of η. Therefore, O(η′) > O(η).
Case (2): For all h, k > r, xhθ(xk)−1 = η(xi) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Because O(η) = r, we
must have η(xr+1) = η(xi) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Without loss of generality, assume
η(xr+1) = η(x1). (4.7)
Subcase (a): x1θ(xr+2)−1 is not in the range of η. Then define
θ′(x1) = θ(xr+2) (4.8)
θ′(xr+2) = θ(x1)
θ′(xi) = θ(xi) for i 6= 1, r + 2 (4.9)
Then
η′(xi) = xiθ′(xi)−1 = xiθ(xi)−1 = η(xi) for i = 2, . . . , r by (4.9).
In addition,
η′(xr+1) = xr+1θ′(xr+1)−1 = xr+1θ(xr+1)−1 = η(xr+1) = η(x1)
by (4.9) and (4.7), and because η(x1) 6= η(xi) for i ∈ {2, . . . , r}, O(η′) ≥ O(η). Finally,
η′(x1) = x1θ′(x1)−1 = x1θ(xr+2)−1 by (4.8)
which is not in the range of η. Therefore, O(η′) > O(η).
Subcase (b): x1θ(xr+2)−1 is in the range of η. That is, there is some i ∈ {1, . . . , r} so that
x1θ(xr+2)−1 = η(xi). Because θ−1 is a permutation,
x1θ(xr+2)−1 6= x1θ(x1)−1 = η(x1).
Therefore, without loss of generality, assume
x1θ(xr+2)−1 = η(x2). (4.10)
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Subcase (bi): x2θ(x1)−1 is not in the range of η. Then define
θ′(x1) = θ(xr+2) (4.11)
θ′(x2) = θ(x1) (4.12)
θ′(xr+2) = θ(x2)
θ′(xi) = θ(xi) for i 6= 1, 2, r + 2 (4.13)
Then
η′(xi) = xiθ′(xi)−1 = xiθ(xi)−1 = η(xi) for i = 3, . . . , r by (4.13).
In addition,
η′(xr+1) = η(xr+1) = xr+1θ′(xr+1)−1 = xr+1θ(xr+1)−1 = η(x1) by (4.13) and (4.7)
and
η′(x1) = x1θ′(x1)−1 = x1θ(xr+2)−1 = η(x2) by (4.11) and (4.10).
Therefore, O(η′) ≥ O(η). Finally,
η′(x2) = x2θ′(x2)−1 = x2θ(x1)−1 by (4.12)
which is not in the range of η. Therefore, O(η′) > O(η).
Subcase (bii): x2θ(x1)−1 = η(xi) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Notice that x2θ(x1)−1 6= η(x1) and
x2θ(x1)−1 6= η(x2), so assume without loss of generality that
x2θ(x1)−1 = η(x3).
Continue considering cases. If x3θ(x2)−1 is not in the range of η, then we can show that
O(η′) > O(η) by an argument similar to the one in case bi. If x3θ(x2)−1 is in the range of η, we
can show that x3θ(x2)−1 6= η(xi) for i = 1, 2, 3. Therefore, without loss of generality assume
that x3θ(x2)−1 = η(x4). Continue in the same way until we have
η(xr+1) = η(x1)
x1θ(xr+2)−1 = η(x2) (4.14)
xi+1θ(xi)−1 = η(xi+2) for i = 1, . . . , k, where k + 2 ≤ r. (4.15)
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Claim. We now want to show that
η(x1)θ(xr+2)−1 = η(xi+1)θ(xi)−1
for i = 1, . . . , k + 1, where k + 2 ≤ r.
Proof. This will be shown by induction on i.
Base Case: i = 1.
η(x1)θ(xr+2)−1 = x1θ(x1)−1θ(xr+2)−1
= θ(x1)−1x1θ(xr+2)−1
= θ(x1)−1η(x2) by (4.14)
= η(x1+1)θ(x1)−1.
Induction Step: Assume
η(x1)θ(xr+2)−1 = η(xi+1)θ(xi)−1 (4.16)
for all i ≤ j, for some j < k + 1 and show that
η(x1)θ(xr+2)−1 = η(xi+2)θ(xi+1)−1.
Recall that we already know
xi+1θ(xi)−1 = η(xi+2) for i = 1, . . . , k by (4.15)
so in particular,
xj+1θ(xi)−1 = η(xi+2). (4.17)
Therefore,
η(x1)θ(xr+2)−1 = η(xi+1)θ(xi)−1 by (4.16)
= xi+1θ(xi+1)−1θ(xi)−1
= θ(xi+1)−1η(xi+2) by (4.17)
47
and so we have
η(x1)θ(xr+2)−1 = η(xi+1)θ(xi)−1 (4.18)
for i = 1, . . . , k + 1, where k + 2 ≤ r.
Next, we need to show that xk+2θ(xk+1)−1 6= η(xi) for i = 1, . . . , k+2. Assume not. Then
there is some i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 2} so that
xk+2θ(xk+1)−1 = η(xi). (4.19)
This implies that for this value of i,
η(xi)θ(xk+2)−1 = xk+2θ(xk+1)−1θ(xk+2)−1 by (4.19)
= θ(xk+1)−1η(xk+2)
= θ(xi−1)−1η(xi) by (4.18).
This implies that θ(xk+2)−1 = θ(xi−1)−1. But θ−1 is a permutation, so this is a contradiction
because i ≤ k + 1, so i− 1 6= k + 2. Therefore,
xk+2θ(xk+1)−1 6= η(xi) for i = 1, . . . , k + 2.
Consider the following subcases:
Subcase(a): xk+2θ(xk+1)−1 is not in the range of η. Then define
θ′(x1) = θ(xr+2) (4.20)
θ′(xi+1) = θ(xi) for i = 1, . . . , k + 1 (4.21)
θ′(xr+2) = θ(xk+2)
θ′(xi) = θ(xi) for i = k + 3, . . . , r, r + 1, r + 3, . . . , n. (4.22)
Then we have the following:
η′(xi) = xiθ′(xi)−1 = xiθ(xi)−1 = η(xi) for i = k + 3, . . . , r by (4.22)
η′(xi+1) = xi+1θ′(xi+1)−1 = xi+1θ(xi)−1 = η(xi+2) for i = 1, . . . , k by (4.21) and (4.15)
η′(x1) = x1θ′(x1)−1 = x1θ(xr+2)−1 = η(x2) by (4.20) and (4.14)
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η′(xr+1) = xr+1θ′(xr+1)−1 = xr+1θ(xr+1)−1 = η(xr+1) = η(x1) by (4.22) and (4.7).
Therefore, O(η′) ≥ O(η). Finally,
η′(xk+2) = xk+2θ′(xk+2)−1 = xk+2θ(xk+1)−1 by (4.21)
which is not in the range of η. Therefore, O(η′) > O(η).
Subcase (b): xk+2θ(xk+1)−1 = η(xi) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. We already know that
xk+2θ(xk+1)−1 6= η(xi) for i = 1, . . . , k+2. Without loss of generality, assume xk+2θ(xk+1)−1 =
η(xk+3).
Continue in the same fashion, breaking down into subcases. Eventually, because r is finite,
we will reach a point where xjθ(xj−1)−1 is not in the range of η and there is no “alternative”
subcase. This will imply that O(η′) > O(η), as desired.
Finally, we are ready to prove the main proposition. We already know that if G has exactly
one element of order 2, then G is not admissible by Corollary 2. Therefore, all that is left to
show is that if G does not have exactly one element of order 2, then G is admissible.
By Lemma 3, possibly applied multiple times, we know that there is some θ : G → G so
that O(η) ≥ n− 1. We need to show that O(η) = n.
Let G = {x1, . . . , xn} and let {η(xi) : i = 1, . . . , n − 1} be the range elements of η which
we know are distinct. Let z be the “leftover” element of G. If we can show that η(xn) = z,
then we will have shown that η is 1-1 and hence that G is admissible. Consider the following:
n−1∏
i=1
xiθ(xi)−1 =
n−1∏
i=1
η(xi)
x−1n θ(xn)
n∏
i=1
xiθ(xi)−1 = z−1z
n−1∏
i=1
η(xi)
x−1n θ(xn)
n∏
i=1
xi
n∏
i=1
θ(xi)−1 = z−1
(
n−1∏
i=1
η(xi)
)
z
Notice that
n∏
i=1
xi =
n∏
i=1
θ(xi)−1 =
(
n−1∏
i=1
η(xi)
)
z. Call this product p. Because G does not
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have exactly one element of order 2, p = 1. Therefore, we have
x−1n θ(xn)p
2 = z−1p
x−1n θ(xn) = z
−1
xnθ(xn)−1 = z
η(xn) = z
Hence η is a permutation, and G is admissible.
Because Z2m is abelian and has exactly one element of order 2 for any integerm, Proposition
2 tells us that Z2m is not admissible. However, any finite abelian group of odd order is
admissible because it has no elements of order 2 (since the order of an element must divide
the order of the group). Also, if |G| > 2 and G has exponent 2, then G is admissible because
every non-identity element in G has order 2. Therefore, the group (Zk2,⊕), where
Zk2 = {〈xk−1, xk−2, . . . , x1, x0〉 : xi ∈ Z2 for i = 0, . . . , k − 1}
and ⊕ denotes exclusive-or, is admissible when k > 1.
Recall that the quasigroups we create will be used for cryptographic purposes. This implies
that the message will need to be written as a sequence of elements from the quasigroup. Because
messages are often written as binary strings, it is most convenient for our purposes to create a
quasigroup from the group (Zk2,⊕). In addition, there are many complete mappings on (Zk2,⊕).
Now that we have a method of determining whether a group is admissible, we need to look
at how to create a quasigroup from an admissible group and a complete mapping.
4.2.2 Creating Quasigroups Using Complete Maps
In (10), Sade suggests creating a quasigroup (Q, ◦) from an admissible group (Q,+) and a
complete mapping θ by defining
x ◦ y = θ(x− y) + y
for x, y ∈ Q.
Claim. If x ◦ y is defined as above, then (Q, ◦) is a quasigroup.
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Proof. Clearly, Q is closed under ◦. Therefore, we just need to show that (Q, ◦) has unique
solubility of equations. This can be done by showing that La(x) = a ◦ x and Ra(x) = x ◦ a are
permutations, for all a ∈ Q.
First, show that La(x) is one-to-one for some arbitrary a ∈ Q. Assume that La(x) = La(y)
and show that x = y. Notice that because (i− θ)(x) is a permutation, then
x− θ(x) = y − θ(y) ⇒ x = y (4.23)
Therefore, we have
La(x) = La(y)
a ◦ x = a ◦ y
θ(a− x) + x = θ(a− y) + y
θ(a− x) + x− a = θ(a− y) + y − a
(a− x)− θ(a− x) = (a− y)− θ(a− y) by (4.23)
a− x = a− y
x = y
Next, show that La(x) is onto. Let y ∈ Q. We need to find x ∈ Q so that La(x) = y.
Because i− θ is a permutation and because G is closed under subtraction, there is some n ∈ Q
so that n− θ(n) = a− y. Notice that this implies θ(n) = y− a+n. Choose x = −n+ a. Then
La(x) = a ◦ x
= θ(a− x) + x
= θ(a− (−n+ a))− n+ a
= θ(n)− n+ a
= y − a+ n− n+ a
= y
Hence La(x) is a permutation on (Q, ◦). Now we need to show that Ra(x) is also a permutation
on Q.
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Again, first show that Ra(x) is one-to-one. Assume that Ra(x) = Ra(y) and show that
x = y.
Ra(x) = Ra(y)
x ◦ a = y ◦ a
θ(x− a) + a = θ(y − a) + a
θ(x− a) = θ(y − a)
x− a = y − a
x = y
Finally, show that Ra(x) is onto. Let y ∈ Q. We need to find x ∈ Q so that Ra(x) = y.
Because θ is a permutation and because G is closed under subtraction, there is some n ∈ Q so
that θ(n) = y − a. Choose x = n+ a. Then
Ra(x) = Ra(n+ a)
= (n+ a) ◦ a
= θ(n+ a− a) + a
= θ(n) + a
= y − a+ a
= a
Hence Ra is a permutation and therefore (Q, ◦) is a quasigroup.
Example 12. Let Q be the additive group of five elements. That is, Q = Z5 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
where x+y is computed modulo 5 for x, y ∈ Q. By Proposition 2, Q is admissible because it is a
finite abelian group which does not have exactly one element of order 2 (in particular, it has no
elements of order 2). Let θ : Q→ Q be given by θ(x) = 2x. Then (i−θ)(x) = x−2x = −x = 4x
and so θ is a complete mapping. If we create (Q, ◦) by x ◦ y = θ(x− y) + y, then the Cayley
table for (Q, ◦) is shown in Figure 4.12. Notice that although (Q,+) is a group, (Q, ◦) is not
associative nor commutative and has no identity element.
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Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 4 3 2 1
1 2 1 0 4 3
2 4 3 2 1 0
3 1 0 4 3 2
4 3 2 1 0 4
Figure 4.12 The Cayley table for (Q, ◦)
If we choose (Q,+) = (Zk2,⊕), then a quasigroup operation is defined by
x ◦ y = θ(x⊕ y)⊕ y.
Example 13. Let (Q,+) = (Z32,⊕) and let
θ(〈x2, x1, x0〉) =

〈x1, x0 ⊕ 1, x2〉 if x2 = 0;
〈x1 ⊕ 1, x0 ⊕ 1, x2〉 if x2 = 1.
Then θ and i ⊕ θ are permutations as shown in Figure 4.13. If the elements of (Z32,⊕) are
represented as integers corresponding to binary strings for ease of notation, then θ and i − θ
are shown in Figure 4.14 and the quasigroup created by x◦ y = θ(x⊕ y)⊕ y is shown in Figure
4.15. As in Example 12, note that although (Z32,⊕) is an abelian group, (Z32, ◦) is neither
commutative nor associative and has no identity element.
x θ(x) (i⊕ θ)(x)
〈0, 0, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0〉
〈0, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0〉 〈0, 0, 1〉
〈0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0〉
〈0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1〉
〈1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1〉
〈1, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0〉
〈1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1〉
〈1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 1, 0〉
Figure 4.13 θ and i⊕ θ on Z32
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x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
θ(x) 2 0 6 4 7 5 3 1
(i⊕ θ)(x) 2 1 4 7 3 0 5 6
Figure 4.14 θ and i⊕ θ on integers corresponding to elements of Z32
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 2 1 4 7 3 0 5 6
1 0 3 6 5 1 2 7 4
2 6 5 0 3 7 4 1 2
3 4 7 2 1 5 6 3 0
4 7 4 1 2 6 5 0 3
5 5 6 3 0 4 7 1 2
6 3 0 5 6 2 1 4 7
7 1 2 7 4 0 3 6 5
Figure 4.15 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) created using the complete map θ
4.2.2.1 Affine Complete Mappings
As with isotopies, we could choose our complete mapping to have special properties. If we
choose θ to be an affine complete map and create (Q, ◦) by x ◦ y = θ(x − y) + y, then (Q, ◦)
is again isotopic to (Q,+). That is, creating a quasigroup by using an affine complete map is
simply a special case of creating a quasigroup by isotopy. In this case, the isotopy is given by
f(x) = θ(x) and g(x) = θ(−x) + θ(0) + x, because
x ◦ y = θ(x− y) + y
= θ(x+ (−y)) + y
= θ(x) + θ(−y)− θ(0) + y because θ is affine.
= f(x) + g(y)
Because both θ and i − θ are bijections, f and g are bijections, so this is indeed an isotopy.
In addition, because θ is an affine map, f and g are also affine maps. This implies that the
pairing properties discussed in Section 4.1.1 will be present in (Q, ◦).
If (Q, ◦) is a quasigroup created from a group (Q,⊕) of exponent 2 by an affine complete
mapping θ (so that x ◦ y = θ(x⊕ y)⊕ y), then Property 2 can be restated in a simpler form.
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Property 5. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup created from the group (Q,⊕) of exponent 2 by
x ◦ y = θ(x⊕ y)⊕ y for x, y ∈ Q
where θ : Q→ Q is an affine complete mapping. Then rows x and y are paired over k (in the
sense of Definition 10) if and only if x ◦ k = θ(y). That is, for any z ∈ Q,
x ◦ z = y ◦ (z ⊕ k)⇔ x ◦ k = θ(y) (4.24)
Notice that for x, k ∈ Q, y is guaranteed to exist because of unique solubility of equations in
a quasigroup.
Similarly, columns x and y are paired over k (in the sense of Definition 11) if and only if
k ◦ x = (i⊕ θ)(y). That is, for any z ∈ Q,
z ◦ x = (z ⊕ k) ◦ y ⇔ k ◦ x = y ⊕ θ(y) (4.25)
Again, notice that y is guaranteed to exist.
Proof. Only (4.24) will be proved; the proof of (4.25) is similar.
⇒ Assume that x ◦ z = y ◦ (z ⊕ k). Let 0 ∈ Q denote the group identity element. Then we
have
θ(x⊕ z) = θ(y ⊕ (z ⊕ k))⊕ (z ⊕ k)
θ(x)⊕ θ(z)⊕ θ(0)⊕ z = θ(y)⊕ θ(z ⊕ k)⊕ θ(0)⊕ z ⊕ k
θ(x)⊕ θ(z) = θ(y)⊕ θ(z)⊕ θ(k)⊕ θ(0)⊕ k
θ(x)⊕ θ(k)⊕ θ(0)⊕ k = θ(y)
θ(x⊕ k)⊕ k = θ(y)
x ◦ k = y
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⇐ Assume that x ◦ k = θ(y). Then we have
θ(x⊕ k)⊕ k = θ(y)
θ(x)⊕ θ(k)⊕ θ(0)⊕ k = θ(y)
θ(x)⊕ θ(z)⊕ θ(0)⊕ z = θ(y)⊕ θ(k)⊕ k ⊕ θ(z)⊕ z
θ(x⊕ z)⊕ z = θ(y)⊕ θ(k ⊕ z)⊕ θ(0)⊕ k ⊕ z
θ(x⊕ z)⊕ z = θ(y ⊕ (z ⊕ k))⊕ z ⊕ k
x ◦ z = y ◦ (z ⊕ k)
Example 14. Let Q = Z42 and define θ : Q→ Q by
θ(〈x3, x2, x1, x0〉) = 〈x3 ⊕ x2, x1, x0, x3〉.
That is, θ is defined by rotating the bits of x ∈ Q one bit to the left and exclusive or-ing the
“new” first component of x with the “old” first component of x. In order to prove that (Q, ◦)
is a quasigroup, we need to show that θ is a complete map. We also need to show that θ is
affine in order to prove that the pairing properties of Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 are present in
(Q, ◦).
Claim. θ is an affine map.
Proof. In order to show that θ is affine, we need to show that θ(x ⊕ y) = θ(x) ⊕ θ(y) ⊕ θ(0)
for all x, y ∈ Q. Notice that θ(0) = 0. θ is affine because
θ(〈x3, x2, x1, x0〉 ⊕ 〈y3, y2, y1, y0〉) = θ(〈x3 ⊕ y3, x2 ⊕ y2, x1 ⊕ y1, x0 ⊕ y0〉)
= 〈x3 ⊕ y3 ⊕ x2 ⊕ y2, x1 ⊕ y1, x0 ⊕ y0, x3 ⊕ y3〉
= 〈x3 ⊕ x2, x1, x0, x3〉 ⊕ 〈y3 ⊕ y2, y1, y0, y3〉
= θ(x)⊕ θ(y)⊕ θ(0).
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To see that θ is a complete map, notice that Figure 4.16 demonstrates that both θ and
i ⊕ θ are bijections. This can also be seen in Figure 4.17, which shows how θ and i ⊕ θ act
on the integer representations of the elements of (Q, ◦). The quasigroup (Q, ◦) created from θ
by x ◦ y = θ(x ⊕ y) ⊕ y is shown in Figure 4.18. Again, notice that all the pairing properties
discussed in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 are present in (Q, ◦).
x θ(x) x⊕ θ(x)
〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉
〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉
〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉
〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉
〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉
〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉
〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉
〈0, 1, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉
〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉
〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉
〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉
〈1, 0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉
〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 1, 0, 1〉
〈1, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉
〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉
〈1, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉
Figure 4.16 θ and i⊕ θ on Z42
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
θ(x) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 9 11 13 15 1 3 5 7
x⊕ θ(x) 0 3 6 5 12 15 10 9 1 2 7 4 13 14 11 8
Figure 4.17 θ and i⊕ θ on integers corresponding to elements of Z42
Because QMAC requires that we work with large quasigroups, Example 14 is interesting,
but not particularly useful. However, this method could be useful if it could be extended to
define θ : Zk2 → Zk2. It turns out that we can indeed extend this method by defining θ : Zk2 → Zk2
by
θ(〈xk−1, xk−2, . . . , x1, x0〉) = 〈xk−1 ⊕ xk−2, xk−3, . . . , x0, xk−1〉.
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Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0 3 6 5 12 15 10 9 1 2 7 4 13 14 11 8
1 2 1 4 7 14 13 8 11 3 0 5 6 15 12 9 10
2 4 7 2 1 8 11 14 13 5 6 3 0 9 10 15 12
3 6 5 0 3 10 9 12 15 7 4 1 2 11 8 13 14
4 8 11 14 13 4 7 2 1 9 10 15 12 5 6 3 0
5 10 9 12 15 6 5 0 3 11 8 13 14 7 4 1 2
6 12 15 10 9 0 3 6 5 13 14 11 8 1 2 7 4
7 14 13 8 11 2 1 4 7 15 12 9 10 3 0 5 6
8 9 10 15 12 5 6 3 0 8 11 14 13 4 7 2 1
9 11 8 13 14 7 4 1 2 10 9 12 15 6 5 0 3
10 13 14 11 8 1 2 7 4 12 15 10 9 0 3 6 5
11 15 12 9 10 3 0 5 6 14 13 8 11 2 1 4 7
12 1 2 7 4 13 14 11 8 0 3 6 5 12 15 10 9
13 3 0 5 6 15 12 9 10 2 1 4 7 14 13 8 11
14 5 6 3 0 9 10 15 12 4 7 2 1 8 11 14 13
15 7 4 1 2 11 8 13 14 6 5 0 3 10 9 12 15
Figure 4.18 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) created using the map θ.
The proof in Example 14 can be easily modified to show that θ : Zk2 → Zk2 is also affine.
However, the “proof” in Example 14 that θ was a complete map relied on an exhaustive listing
of the images of θ and i⊕ θ on Z42. Clearly, this is not possible on Zk2. Therefore, we need to
show that θ is a complete map in another way.
Claim. θ : Zk2 → Zk2 is a complete map (that is, both θ and i⊕ θ are permutations).
Proof. Notice that because we are working in a finite group, we only need to show that both
functions are one-to-one.
To show that θ is one-to-one, assume that θ(x) = θ(y) and show that x = y. Because
θ(x) = θ(y), we have
〈xk−1 ⊕ xk−2, xk−3, . . . , x0, xk−1〉 = 〈yk−1 ⊕ yk−2, yk−3, . . . , y0, yk−1〉.
This shows that xi = yi for i = 0, . . . , k−3, k−1. In addition, because xk−1⊕xk−2 = yk−1⊕yk−2
and xk−1 = yk−1, we must also have xk−2 = yk−2. Therefore, x = y and so θ is a bijection.
To show that i ⊕ θ is one-to-one, assume that x ⊕ θ(x) = y ⊕ θ(y) and show that x = y.
Notice that
x⊕ θ(x) = 〈xk−1, xk−2, . . . , x1, x0〉 ⊕ 〈xk−1 ⊕ xk−2, xk−3, . . . , x0, xk−1〉
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and
y ⊕ θ(y) = 〈yk−1, yk−2, . . . , y1, y0〉 ⊕ 〈yk−1 ⊕ yk−2, yk−3, . . . , y0, yk−1〉.
Therefore,
〈xk−2, xk−2 ⊕ xk−3, . . . , x1 ⊕ x0, x0 ⊕ xk−1〉 = 〈yk−2, yk−2 ⊕ yk−3, . . . , y1 ⊕ y0, y0 ⊕ yk−1〉.
By looking at the most significant bit, we can see that xk−2 = yk−2, and by equating the rest
of the bits, we can clearly see that xi = yi for i = 0, . . . , k − 1. Therefore, x = y and so i⊕ θ
is also a bijection. This implies that θ is a complete map, as desired.
Notice that the quasigroup created in Example 14 is idempotent. That is, for all x ∈ Q,
x ◦ x = x. This is also true for the extended mapping θ on Zk2 because
x ◦ x = θ(x⊕ x)⊕ x
= θ(0)⊕ x
= 0⊕ x
= x
It seems as though this property may compromise the security of a keyed hash function, so we
would like to change θ so that the quasigroup created is not idempotent. It is actually quite
easy to define another mapping ψ : Q→ Q based on θ so that ψ is a complete affine map but
the quasigroup created is not idempotent. We define ψ by
ψ(〈xk−1, xk−2, . . . , x1, x0〉) = 〈xk−1 ⊕ xk−2, xk−3, . . . , x0, xk−1 ⊕ 1〉.
It can be shown that ψ is an affine complete map in the same way that these properties were
shown for θ. If ψ : Z42 → Z42, then the action of ψ on the group elements is shown in Figure
4.19 and on the binary representations of the group elements in Figure 4.20. The quasigroup
(Q, ?) created is shown in Figure 4.21.
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x ψ(x) x⊕ ψ(x)
〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉
〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉
〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉
〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉
〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 1, 0, 1〉
〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉
〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉
〈0, 1, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉
〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉
〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉
〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉
〈1, 0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉
〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉
〈1, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉
〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉
〈1, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉
Figure 4.19 ψ and i⊕ ψ on Z42
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ψ(x) 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 8 10 12 14 0 2 4 6
x⊕ ψ(x) 1 2 7 4 13 14 11 8 0 3 6 5 12 15 10 9
Figure 4.20 ψ and i⊕ ψ on integers corresponding to elements of Z42
Q =
? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 1 2 7 4 13 14 11 8 0 3 6 5 12 15 10 9
1 3 0 5 6 15 12 9 10 2 1 4 7 14 13 8 11
2 5 6 3 0 9 10 15 12 4 7 2 1 8 11 14 13
3 7 4 1 2 11 8 13 14 6 5 0 3 10 9 12 15
4 9 10 15 12 5 6 3 0 8 11 14 13 4 7 2 1
5 11 8 13 14 7 4 1 2 10 9 12 15 6 5 0 3
6 13 14 11 8 1 2 7 4 12 15 10 9 0 3 6 5
7 15 12 9 10 3 0 5 6 14 13 8 11 2 1 4 7
8 8 11 14 13 4 7 2 1 9 10 15 12 5 6 3 0
9 10 9 12 15 6 5 0 3 11 8 13 14 7 4 1 2
10 12 15 10 9 0 3 6 5 13 14 11 8 1 2 7 4
11 14 13 8 11 2 1 4 7 15 12 9 10 3 0 5 6
12 0 3 6 5 12 15 10 9 1 2 7 4 13 14 11 8
13 2 1 4 7 14 13 8 11 3 0 5 6 15 12 9 10
14 4 7 2 1 8 11 14 13 5 6 3 0 9 10 15 12
15 6 5 0 3 10 9 12 15 7 4 1 2 11 8 13 14
Figure 4.21 The quasigroup (Q, ?) created using an affine complete map.
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4.2.2.2 Non-affine Complete Mappings
There are also complete mappings θ which are not affine. Because the map is not affine,
the pairing properties discussed in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 may not be present. This creates a
quasigroup which is less structured. Using quasigroups with less structure make QMAC more
secure. In this section, we will look at two examples of quasigroups created with non-affine
complete mappings. Notice that the quasigroup in Example 15 still has the element pairing
property described in Property 1 (with k = 1), but not Properties 2 or 4. The quasigroup in
Example 16 has none of these properties.
Example 15. Let θ : Z42 → Z42 be as shown in Figure 4.22. Then the action of θ on the
binary representations of the group elements is shown in Figure 4.23 and the quasigroup (Q, ◦)
created is shown in Figure 4.24, where x ◦ y = θ(x⊕ y)⊕ y.
x θ(x) x⊕ θ(x)
〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉
〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉
〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉
〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉
〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉
〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉
〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉
〈0, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉
〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉
〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉
〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉
〈1, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉
〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉
〈1, 1, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉
〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉
〈1, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 0, 1〉
Figure 4.22 A non-affine complete map θ and i⊕ θ on Z42
First, notice that θ is not affine, because
θ(2⊕ 4) = θ(6) = 1 but θ(2)⊕ θ(4)⊕ θ(0) = 8⊕ 4⊕ 14 = 2.
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x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
θ(x) 14 10 8 12 4 0 1 5 11 15 3 7 13 9 6 2
x⊕ θ(x) 14 11 10 15 0 5 7 2 3 6 9 12 1 4 8 13
Figure 4.23 θ and i⊕ θ on integers corresponding to elements of Z42
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 14 11 10 15 0 5 7 2 3 6 9 12 1 4 8 13
1 10 15 14 11 4 1 3 6 7 2 13 8 5 0 12 9
2 8 13 12 9 5 0 2 7 11 14 1 4 10 15 3 6
3 12 9 8 13 1 4 6 3 15 10 5 0 14 11 7 2
4 4 1 3 6 10 15 14 11 5 0 12 9 7 2 13 8
5 0 5 7 2 14 11 10 15 1 4 8 13 3 6 9 12
6 1 4 6 3 12 9 8 13 14 11 7 2 15 10 5 0
7 5 0 2 7 8 13 12 9 10 15 3 6 11 14 1 4
8 11 14 1 4 9 12 0 5 6 3 2 7 8 13 15 10
9 15 10 5 0 13 8 4 1 2 7 6 3 12 9 11 14
10 3 6 9 12 2 7 11 14 0 5 4 1 13 8 10 15
11 7 2 13 8 6 3 15 10 4 1 0 5 9 12 14 11
12 13 8 4 1 15 10 5 0 12 9 11 14 2 7 6 3
13 9 12 0 5 11 14 1 4 8 13 15 10 6 3 2 7
14 6 3 15 10 7 2 13 8 9 12 14 11 4 1 0 5
15 2 7 11 14 3 6 9 12 13 8 10 15 0 5 4 1
Figure 4.24 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) created using the non-affine complete
map θ.
Therefore, Property 2 does not hold because the proof of this property required that θ was
affine. In addition, Property 4 does not hold because
5 ◦ 7 = 10 ◦ 15 but 5 ◦ 15 6= 10 ◦ 7.
However, θ does have the property that
θ(x⊕ 1) = θ(x)⊕ θ(1)⊕ θ(0)
for all x ∈ Z42. This is the only condition that we needed to prove Property 1, with k = 1, so
the element pairing property still holds even though θ is not affine.
Example 16. Let θ : Z42 → Z42 be as shown in Figure 4.25. Then the action of θ on the
binary representations of the group elements is shown in Figure 4.26 and the quasigroup (Q, ◦)
created is shown in Figure 4.27, where x ◦ y = θ(x⊕ y)⊕ y.
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x θ(x) x⊕ θ(x)
〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉
〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉
〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉
〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 0, 1〉
〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉
〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 〈1, 1, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉
〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉
〈0, 1, 1, 1〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0〉
〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉
〈1, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉
〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉
〈1, 0, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉
〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 1, 1〉 〈1, 0, 1, 1〉
〈1, 1, 0, 1〉 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉
〈1, 1, 1, 0〉 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉
〈1, 1, 1, 1〉 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉
Figure 4.25 A non-affine complete map θ and i⊕ θ on Z42
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
θ(x) 12 6 3 14 2 13 5 9 8 11 15 1 7 4 10 0
x⊕ θ(x) 12 7 1 13 6 8 3 14 0 2 5 10 11 9 4 15
Figure 4.26 θ and i⊕ θ on integers corresponding to elements of Z42
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 12 7 1 13 6 8 3 14 0 2 5 10 11 9 4 15
1 6 13 12 0 9 7 15 2 3 1 11 4 8 10 14 5
2 3 15 14 5 1 12 4 10 7 8 2 0 6 13 9 11
3 14 3 4 15 13 0 11 5 9 6 1 3 12 7 10 8
4 2 12 7 10 8 3 5 9 15 13 0 11 4 6 1 14
5 13 3 11 6 2 9 8 4 12 14 10 1 7 5 15 0
6 5 8 0 14 7 11 10 1 2 9 13 15 3 12 6 4
7 9 4 15 1 10 6 0 11 8 3 14 12 13 2 5 7
8 8 10 13 2 3 1 12 7 4 15 9 5 14 0 11 6
9 11 9 3 12 0 2 6 13 14 5 4 8 1 15 7 10
10 15 0 10 8 14 5 1 3 11 7 6 13 8 4 12 2
11 1 14 9 11 4 15 2 0 6 10 12 7 5 8 3 13
12 7 5 8 3 12 14 9 6 10 4 15 2 0 11 13 1
13 4 6 2 9 15 13 7 8 5 11 3 14 10 1 0 12
14 10 1 5 7 11 4 14 12 13 0 8 6 15 3 2 9
15 0 11 6 4 5 10 13 15 1 12 7 9 2 14 8 3
Figure 4.27 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) created using the non-affine complete
map θ.
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As in Example 15, notice that θ is not affine, because
θ(1⊕ 2) = θ(3) = 14 but θ(1)⊕ θ(2)⊕ θ(0) = 6⊕ 3⊕ 12 = 9.
This again shows that Property 2 does not hold. Property 4 does not hold because
3 ◦ 4 = 14 ◦ 8 but 3 ◦ 8 6= 14 ◦ 4.
In addition, for all x ∈ Q, there is some k ∈ Q so that
θ(x⊕ k) 6= θ(x)⊕ θ(k)⊕ θ(0).
Therefore, there is no pairing of elements for any k ∈ Q and Property 1 also does not hold.
4.3 T-functions
Another way of creating a quasigroup uses a special type of function defined by Klimov
and Shamir in (6). Recall that
∏k
i=1 Zn2 denotes the set of ordered k-tuples whose components
are binary strings of length n. For ease of notation, if f :
∏k
i=1 Zn2 →
∏l
i=1 Zn2 and x =
〈xk−1, xk−2, . . . , x1, x0〉, let [x]?,i denote the ith bit of x? and let [f(x)]?,i denote the ith bit of
component ? of f(x). If l = 1 (that is, f :
∏k
i=1 Zn2 → Zn2 ), then f(x) has only one component,
so denote its ith bit by [f(x)]i.
Definition 14. Let f :
∏k
i=1 Zn2 →
∏l
i=1 Zn2 . f is a T-function if for all x ∈
∏k
i=1 Zn2 , [f(x)]?,i
depends only on the rightmost i bits of each component of x, for any ? ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Example 17. The addition function f :
∏2
i=1 Zn2 → Zn2 given by f(x, y) = x + y mod 2n is
a T-function. [f(x, y)]0 (that is, the rightmost bit of f(x, y)) depends only on the rightmost
bits of x and y. This is true because [f(x, y)]0 = [x]0 + [y]0. The second bit of f(x, y)
depends on the second bits of x and y, plus the carry from the first bits of x and y. That is,
[f(x, y)]1 = [x]1 + [y]1 + α0, where α0 is the carry from adding the rightmost bits of x and y.
Therefore, α0 only depends on [x]0 and [y]0 and so [f(x, y)]1 only depends on [x]1, [x]0, [y]1, and
[y]0. We can continue in the following way (making the result more precise by using induction
if desired) to see that f(x, y) is a T-function.
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Notice that any function that uses a combination of addition, subtraction, and multipli-
cation modulo 2n and Boolean operations (such as and, or, bitwise exclusive-or) will be a
T-function. This can easily be seen by using an argument similar to the one in Example 17. In
addition, composition of two T-functions will also be a T-function. Because we will be using
T-functions to create a quasigroup, it is convenient to choose k = l, so that f takes as input
and produces as output k many binary strings of length n.
In order to use a T-function f to define a quasigroup operation, we will see that f needs to
be a permutation. Therefore, we need to know which T-functions are invertible. The following
result from (6) answers this question.
Claim. Let v : Zn2 → Zn2 be a T-function. Then f(x) = c + x + 2v(x) mod 2n is invertible,
where c ∈ Z2n . (Notice that f(x) is also a T-function.)
Proof. Because Zn2 is finite, we only need to show that f(x) is 1-1. Assume that f(x) = f(y)
for x, y ∈ Zn2 and show that x = y. Proceed by induction on i, where i represents a bit of x
and y. Let x = 〈xn−1, xn−2, . . . , x1, x0〉 and y = 〈yn−1, yn−2, . . . , y1, y0〉, so i ranges from 0 to
k − 1.
Base Case: i = 0. We need to show that [x]0 = [y]0. Notice that [f(x)]0 = [f(y)]0 because
we assumed that f(x) = f(y). Therefore, we have
[f(x)]0 = [c+ x+ 2v(x)]0
= [c]0 ⊕ [x]0 ⊕ [2v(x)]0
= [c]0 ⊕ [x]0 ⊕ [v(x)]0 ⊕ [v(x)]0
= [c]0 ⊕ [x]0
and
[f(y)]0 = [c+ y + 2v(y)]0
= [c]0 ⊕ [y]0 ⊕ [2v(y)]0
= [c]0 ⊕ [y]0 ⊕ [v(y)]0 ⊕ [v(y)]0
= [c]0 ⊕ [y]0
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Hence [c]0 ⊕ [x]0 = [c]0 ⊕ [y]0 and so [x]0 = [y]0.
Induction Step Assume that [x]j = [y]j for j = 1, . . . , i−1, i < n and show that [x]i = [y]i.
We can see that
[f(x)]i = [c+ x+ 2v(c)]i = [c]i ⊕ [x]i ⊕ [2v(x)]i ⊕ α(x)i
where α(x)i is the carry from the previous bits of f(x) modulo 2. That is, α(x)i depends only
on [f(x)]j for j = 1, . . . , i− 1. However, because bitwise multiplication by 2 simply shifts bits
to the left,
[f(x)]i = [c]i ⊕ [x]i ⊕ [v(x)]i−1 ⊕ α(x)i.
Similarly,
[f(y)]i = [c]i ⊕ [y]i ⊕ [v(y)]i−1 ⊕ α(y)i.
Because v is a T-function, [v(x)]i−1 depends only on [x]j for j = 0, . . . , i−1. Similarly, [v(y)]i−1
depends only on [y]j for j = 0, . . . , i − 1. Therefore, by our induction hypothesis, we know
that [v(x)]i−1 = [v(y)]i−1. In addition, α(x)i depends only on [x]j for j = 0, . . . , i − 1 and
α(y)i depends only on [y]j for j = 0, . . . , i − 1. Our induction hypothesis again implies that
α(x)i = α(y)i. Finally, because f(x) = f(y), we know that [f(x)]i = [f(y)]i and so
[c]i ⊕ [x]i ⊕ [v(x)]i−1 ⊕ α(x)i = [c]i ⊕ [y]i ⊕ [v(y)]i−1 ⊕ α(y)i
[x]i ⊕ [v(x)]i−1 ⊕ α(x)i = [c]i ⊕ [v(y)]i−1 ⊕ α(y)i
[x]i = [y]i
Therefore, x = y and so f(x) = c+ x+ 2v(x) is a T-function if v(x) is a T-function.
The converse of this proposition is also true, but the converse is not needed for this paper,
so it will not be proved.
We can now define a quasigroup operation based on a T-function. Let Q = Zn2 and let
v : Q×Q→ Q be a T-function. Create a quasigroup (Q, ◦) by defining
x ◦ y = c+ (x+ y) + 2v(x, y) mod 2n
where c ∈ Q.
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Claim. If x ◦ y is defined as above, then (Q, ◦) is a quasigroup.
Proof. Because Q is finite, we only need to show that La(x) = a ◦ x and Ra(x) = x ◦ a are
invertible for all a ∈ Q. First, consider La(x) for some arbitrary a ∈ Q.
La(x) = a ◦ x = c+ (a+ x) + 2v(a, x)
= (c+ a) + x+ 2v(a, x)
Notice that if v(y, z) is a T-function of two variables and y is fixed, then we can think of v(y, z)
as a T-function of one variable. Therefore, La(x) has the form of an invertible T-function and
hence La(x) is invertible. A similar argument shows that Ra(x) is also invertible. Therefore,
(Q, ◦) is a quasigroup.
Example 18. Let v : Z32 × Z32 → Z32 be given by
v(x, y) = x2y + 3(x ∨ y)
where addition and multiplication are computed mod 23 = 8 and ∨ represents Boolean or. Let
c = 〈1, 0, 1〉 ∈ Z32. As discussed above, define
x ◦ y = c+ (x+ y) + 2v(x, y) = 5 + x+ y + x2y + 3(x ∨ y).
Then the quasigroup in Figure 4.28 is created, where the binary representatives of the quasi-
group elements are used for ease of notation.
Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 5 4 3 2 1 0 7 6
1 4 7 6 1 0 3 2 5
2 3 2 5 4 7 6 1 0
3 2 5 0 3 6 1 4 7
4 1 0 7 6 5 4 3 2
5 0 3 2 5 4 7 6 1
6 7 6 1 0 3 2 5 4
7 6 1 4 7 2 5 0 3
Figure 4.28 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) created using a T-function v(x, y).
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One possible disadvantage of using a T-function to create a quasigroup can be seen in the
resulting structure present in the quasigroup. In the quasigroup from Example 18, notice that
the entries in each row and each column will alternate between even and odd numbers. That
is, if x ◦ y is even, then x ◦ (y + 1) and (x+ 1) ◦ y will be odd and vice versa. It can be easily
seen that this property holds in any quasigroup created from a T-function. Notice that both
x and y are either even or odd. Clearly, if x is even, then x+ 1 is odd and vice versa. Recall
that
x ◦ y = c+ x+ y + 2v(x, y)
and
x ◦ (y + 1) = c+ x+ y + 1 + 2v(x, y + 1).
Because 2v(·, ·) is always even, the parity of x◦ (y+1) will be different than the parity of x◦y.
Therefore, the entries in each row will alternate between even and odd elements. A similar
argument can be used to show that column entries also alternate.
Chapter 4 assures us that there are efficient methods of creating and storing large quasi-
groups. Using isotopies and complete mappings are two of these methods. In addition, if we
choose affine isotopies or an affine complete mapping, the quasigroup created has special prop-
erties. Now that we know it is practical to work with large quasigroups, Chapter 5 will explore
the other key property required of quasigroups used for QMAC—that these quasigroups are
“highly non-associative”.
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CHAPTER 5. NON-ASSOCIATIVITY OF QUASIGROUPS
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are various methods which are quite efficient for creating
and storing large quasigroups. However, in addition to requiring (Q, ◦) to be large in order
to ensure the security of QMAC, we also need (Q, ◦) to be “highly non-associative”. Recall
that the security of QMAC depends on different keys (that is, different parentheses schemes)
producing different authentication tags. Therefore, if there are a significant number of keys
which “collapse” to create the same authentication tag for a given message, the security of
QMAC will be compromised. The worst-case scenario occurs when every key produces the
same authentication tag for a given message. This will occur if (Q, ◦) is an associative quasi-
group, i.e. a group. Therefore, in order to avoid as much collapsing of keys as possible, we
would like (Q, ◦) to be “as non-associative” as possible.
There are two questions which need to be answered. First, for a given quasigroup (Q, ◦),
how can we determine “how non-associative” it is? One answer to this question will be pre-
sented in Section 5.1. And second, what kind of methods can be used to create large, highly
non-associative quasigroups? Chapter 4 gives a variety of efficient methods for constructing
large quasigroups. However, some of these methods (such as affine isotopies) create quasigroups
which have a significant amount of structure, which may create security issues for QMAC. Sec-
tion 5.2 will examine methods for creating large, highly non-associative quasigroups with very
little structure.
5.1 Measuring the Non-Associativity of Quasigroups
In order to measure “how non-associative” a quasigroup (Q, ◦) is, we will translate the
method used to measure the non-commutativity of groups into a method which measures the
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non-associativity of quasigroups. We need to consider a special group associated with a group
G.
Definition 15. Let (G, ·) be a group and let Lx, Rx denote left and right multiplication by
x ∈ G, respectively. Themultiplication group of (G, ·) is the subgroup of Sym(G) generated
by all left and right multiplications of G. That is, Mult(G) := 〈Lx, Rx : x ∈ G〉Sym(G).
If (G, ·) is an abelian group, then Lx = Rx for all x ∈ G. This implies that when Mult(G)
is generated, a certain amount of “collapsing” occurs, and so Mult(G) is a smaller group.
Therefore, if (G, ·) is “more non-commutative”, then Mult(G) will be a larger group. Hence
we can use the size of Mult(G) to measure “how non-commutative” a group (G, ·) is.
Now consider a quasigroup (Q, ◦). We can define Mult(Q) in the same way that we defined
Mult(G) for a group (G, ·). If (Q, ◦) is associative, then Lx = Ry for all x, y ∈ Q. This implies
that Mult(Q) will be a smaller group. Therefore, a larger multiplication group implies that
(Q, ◦) is “more non-associative”.
Notice that Mult(Q) is a subgroup of Sym(Q), so |Mult(Q)| ≤ |Q|!. This means that the
“most non-associative” quasigroups will have |Mult(Q)| = |Q|!, or Mult(Q) = Sym(Q). This
discussion leads to the following definition.
Definition 16. Let (Q, ◦) be a quasigroup. Q is highly non-associative if Mult(Q) = Sym(Q).
Before determining whether using quasigroups with this type of non-associativity provides
some measure of security for QMAC, we need to determine if it is even possible to use these
type of quasigroups. If there are very few large highly non-associative quasigroups or if they
are difficult to create using some kind of efficient method, then we will need to devise a more
practical way to measure non-associativity. Because the quasigroups used in QMAC are public
knowledge and are not part of Alice and Bob’s secret key, a quasigroup can be used multiple
times and a new quasigroup does not need to be chosen every time a new message is sent.
However, it does not seem wise to use the same quasigroup for every message sent between
Alice and Bob, because Eve may be able to study the structure of the quasigroup and gain
some information about the parenthesis scheme being used as the key. Therefore, although
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we do not need as many quasigroups as messages, we still need a fair number of large highly
non-associative quasigroups in order to make QMAC more secure. The next result from (12)
assures us that there are a large number of these quasigroups.
Definition 17. Let P be a property that a finite quasigroup may or may not possess. Let p(n)
denote the number of Latin squares of order n that are associated with quasigroups having
property P. Let l(n) denote the total number of Latin squares on {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then almost
all finite quasigroups have property P if lim
n→∞
p(n)
l(n)
= 1.
Proposition 3. Almost all finite quasigroups are highly non-associative.
The other criterion for using these types of quasigroups is that they are easy to create and
store (as discussed in Chapter 4). It turns out that this is also the case. Several methods for
creating such quasigroups are discussed in the next section.
5.2 Creating Highly Non-Associative Quasigroups
Before discussing how to create large, highly non-associative quasigroups, it is important
to note that it is easy to create a highly non-associative quasigroup using affine isotopies. This
result is made more precise in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Let (Q,+) be a cyclic group and let g : Q→ Q be a transposition. Then (Q, ◦)
given by x ◦ y = x+ g(y) is a highly non-associative quasigroup (that is, Mult(Q) = Sym(Q)).
Proof. Because (Q, ◦) is generated from isotopy from f = id and g, both f and g appear in
Mult(Q). Because g is a transposition, it is a permutation of order 2.
In addition, Lx and Rx are in Mult(Q) for all x ∈ Q. In particular, La ∈ Mult(Q) for
a ∈ Q where g(a) = a. This implies that La is a cycle of length n = |Q|. Together, g and La
generate the entire symmetric group of size n. Therefore, Sym(Q) = Mult(Q) and so (Q, ◦) is
highly non-associative.
Example 19. Let (Q,+) = (Z8,+) and let g interchange the elements 0 and 1. Then the
Cayley table for (Q, ◦) created by x ◦ y = x+ g(y) is shown in Figure 5.1. Notice that because
of Proposition 4, |Mult(Q)| = 8!, but (Q, ◦) is clearly a highly structured quasigroup.
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Q =
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 1 3 4 5 6 7 0
2 3 2 4 5 6 7 0 1
3 4 3 5 6 7 0 1 2
4 5 4 6 7 0 1 2 3
5 6 5 7 0 1 2 3 4
6 7 6 0 1 2 3 4 5
7 0 7 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 5.1 A structured highly non-associative quasigroup.
In Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, we saw that quasigroups created from abelian groups by affine
isotopies have a significant amount of structure. While it is also true that any quasigroup
created by isotopy from an abelian group has a certain amount of structure, this structure
is amplified if the isotopies are affine maps. Therefore, in addition to requiring that our
quasigroups have full multiplication groups, we need to create them using methods other than
affine isotopies.
5.2.1 Isotopies and Feistel Networks
The basic idea of using isotopies to create large quasigroups still appears to have a certain
amount of promise, as long as we use non-linear bijections for our isotopies. It is easy to
create a table-driven non-linear bijection, which would meet our criteria as long as we didn’t
care about the size of our quasigroups. However, since we need to create large quasigroups
(containing on the order of 216 elements), it is not practical to store two table-driven bijections.
In general, using elementary operations, it is much more difficult to create a non-linear function
which is not table-driven. To solve this problem, we can turn to the work which has been done
in creating non-linear functions for cryptographic purposes.
One commonly used technique for creating a non-linear cryptographic function is a Feistel
network. A Feistel network takes any function and transforms it into a bijection. (See (11)
for an in-depth treatment of Feistel networks.) Methods for creating quasigroups using Feistel
networks are discussed in Sections 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2.
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5.2.1.1 Isotopies Using Two Feistel Network Functions
A Feistel network utilizes an auxiliary function called an S-box to create a bijection as
described in Definition 18.
Definition 18. Let k be a positive integer and let f : Zk2 → Zk2 be any function. Create
F : Z2k2 → Z2k2 by defining
F (l, r) := (r, l ⊕ f(r))
where (l, r) denotes the element of Z2k2 created by concatenating l and r and ⊕ denotes bitwise
exclusive-or.
Notice that F is clearly a bijection because it has an inverse function, which is given by
G(l, r) := (r⊕ f(l), l). In addition, if we start with a non-linear function f , F will usually also
be a non-linear function. Therefore, it is possible to start with a function on Zk2 and create
a non-linear bijection on Z2k2 which is not table-driven. In addition, even if f is table-driven,
we will need to store a much smaller table because f acts on bitstrings of length k instead of
bitstrings of length 2k.
We can use Feistel networks to create two isotopies F and G, and then use these two
isotopies to create a quasigroup, as shown in Example 20.
Example 20. Let f and g be functions from Z32 to itself as shown in Figure 5.2, where the
elements of Z32 are represented as integers for ease of notation. Create F and G using Feistel
networks, and use F and G as isotopies to create (Q, ◦). (That is, Q = Z62, so |Q| = 26, and
x◦y = F (x)⊕G(y) for x, y ∈ Q.) Then the quasigroup (Q, ◦) does not have a full multiplication
group, but
|Sym(Q)|
|Mult(Q)| = 2. (Q, ◦) is too large to display here.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f(x) 3 0 1 6 5 4 2 7
g(x) 6 4 5 2 3 0 7 1
Figure 5.2 Functions f and g used in a Feistel network.
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After creating a number of quasigroups using two functions generated by Feistel net-
works and examining their multiplication groups, we found that a quasigroup with a full
multiplication group was never generated. A significant number of the quasigroups had
Mult(Q) = Alt(Q) as in Example 20, but none had Mult(Q) = Sym(Q). This fact can be
explained by the following proposition from (5).
Proposition 5. Let f : Zk2 → Zk2 and let F : Z2k2 → Z2k2 be created from f by a Feistel network.
Then F is an even permutation.
Proof. We will prove Proposition 5 by decomposing F into two functions σ and θ which map
from Z2k2 to itself and showing that both functions are even permutations when k > 1. Let σ
and θ be given by
σ(x, y) := (x⊕ f(y), y)
θ(x, y) := (y, x)
Then clearly F = θ ◦σ. In addition, the order of both σ and θ is 2, so σ and θ written in cycle
notation consist entirely of disjoint transpositions.
Claim. If k > 1, then θ is an even permutation.
Proof. Notice that θ(x, x) = (x, x) and θ(x, y) = (y, x). Therefore, if x 6= y, θ interchanges x
and y. There are 2k elements of the form (x, x) in Z2k2 , so θ fixes 2k elements and interchanges
22k−2k elements. Therefore, θ consists of 12(22k−2k) disjoint transpositions. But 12(22k−2k) =
2k−1(2k − 1) and because k > 1, 2k−1 is even. Hence θ is made up of an even number of
transpositions and so θ is an even permutation.
Claim. If k > 1, then σ is an even permutation.
Proof. Let 〈0, . . . , 0〉 ∈ Zk2 and let n be the size of the preimage of 〈0, . . . , 0〉 under f . (That
is, n = |{z ∈ Zk2 : f(z) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉}|). If n = 2k, then f(z) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉 for all z ∈ Zk2. This
implies that for all (x, y) ∈ Z2k2 we have
σ(x, y) = (x⊕ f(y), y) = (x, y).
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So σ is the identity permutation and hence is even.
If n < 2k, then there is some y ∈ Zk2 so that f(y) 6= 〈0, . . . , 0〉. Because f(y) 6= 〈0, . . . , 0〉,
we can see that (x, y) 6= σ(x, y). However, we do have the following:
σ(x, y) = (x⊕ f(y), y)
σ(x⊕ f(y), y) = (x⊕ f(y)⊕ f(y), y) = (x, y)
Therefore, σ fixes exactly n elements of Z2k2 and interchanges the rest in pairs. In order to give
a convenient formula for how many elements σ interchanges, notice that σ interchanges (x, y)
in Z2k2 as long as f(y) 6= 〈0, . . . , 0〉. There are 2k choices for x and 2k − n choices for y, so σ
interchanges 2k(2k − n) elements of Z2k2 . Therefore, σ consists of 12 · 2k(2k − n) = 2k−1(2k − n)
disjoint transpositions. Because k > 1, 2k−1 is even. Hence σ is made up of an even number
of transpositions and so σ is an even permutation
Finally, because f is the composition of two even permutations, f is also an even permu-
tation.
Proposition 5 tells us that it is impossible to use two isotopies created using Feistel networks
to generate a highly non-associative quasigroup. However, because Feistel networks are a
promising way to create non-linear functions, we would like to avoid abandoning this method
completely.
5.2.1.2 Isotopies Using One Feistel Network Function
We can still use the idea of isotopies and Feistel networks to create quasigroups with a
large multiplication group. However, in order to make it possible to have Mult(Q) = Sym(Q),
we will need to require that one of the isotopies is an odd permutation. Depending on the
isotopies chosen, this method may not produce a quasigroup with a full multiplication group
every time. However, Proposition 3 implies (and computational results verify) that highly
non-associative quasigroups are relatively easy to generate in this way. One such quasigroup
is shown in Example 21.
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Example 21. Let f : Z22 → Z22 and g : Z42 → Z42 be as shown in Figure 5.3, where the elements
of Z22 and Z42 are represented as integers for ease of notation. Notice that g is a cycle of length
16, so g is an odd permutation. Create F : Z42 → Z42 from f by a Feistel network and use F and
g as isotopies to create (Q, ◦) as shown in Figure 5.4. (That is, Q = Z42 and x◦y = F (x)⊕g(y)
for x, y ∈ Q.) Then (Q, ◦) has a full multiplication group.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
f(x) 2 1 3 0
g(x) 3 15 5 4 2 11 12 13 9 6 0 14 7 10 1 8
Figure 5.3 Functions f (used in a Feistel network) and g (an odd permu-
tation).
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 1 13 7 6 0 9 14 15 11 4 2 12 5 8 3 10
1 6 10 0 1 7 14 9 8 12 3 5 11 2 15 4 13
2 8 4 14 15 9 0 7 6 2 13 11 5 12 1 10 3
3 15 3 9 8 14 7 0 1 5 10 12 2 11 6 13 4
4 0 12 6 7 1 8 15 14 10 5 3 13 4 9 2 11
5 7 11 1 0 6 15 8 9 13 2 4 10 3 14 5 12
6 9 5 15 14 8 1 6 7 3 12 10 4 13 0 11 2
7 14 2 8 9 15 6 1 0 4 11 13 3 10 7 12 5
8 3 15 5 4 2 11 12 13 9 6 0 14 7 10 1 8
9 4 8 2 3 5 12 11 10 14 1 7 9 0 13 6 15
10 10 6 12 13 11 2 5 4 0 15 9 7 14 3 8 1
11 13 1 11 10 12 5 2 3 7 8 14 0 9 4 15 6
12 2 14 4 5 3 10 13 12 8 7 1 15 6 11 0 9
13 5 9 3 2 4 13 10 11 15 0 6 8 1 12 7 14
14 11 7 13 12 10 3 4 5 1 14 8 6 15 2 9 0
15 12 0 10 11 13 4 3 2 6 9 15 1 8 5 14 7
Figure 5.4 The quasigroup (Q, ◦) created using a Feistel network and an
odd permutation.
Notice that because (Q, ◦) was created from (Z42,⊕) by isotopy, it necessarily has the pairing
of elements described in Property 4 of Section 4.1.2. However, none of the pairing properties
from Section 4.1.1 are present in (Q, ◦). Therefore, although (Q, ◦) has some structure, the
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choices of f and g ensure that it does not have as much structure as a quasigroup created by
affine isotopies.
As mentioned above, Feistel networks appear to be a promising way to create non-linear
functions, resulting in a quasigroup with a full multiplication group. In addition, only f and
g need to be stored in order to create (Q, ◦), and performing multiplication in (Q, ◦) does
not require a table look-up. It appears that it would be worthwhile to explore using a Feistel
network to create (Q, ◦) from a non-abelian group (Q, ?) by isotopy. Perhaps this method
will again result in a quasigroup with a full multiplication group, but with significantly less
structure than a quasigroup created by isotopy from an abelian group.
5.2.2 Isotopies and Linear Feedback Shift Registers
As mentioned previously, we can use a Feistel network and an odd permutation as iso-
topies to create a quasigroup with a full multiplication group. We proposed one method for
creating this odd permutation in Section 5.2.1.2. In this section, we would like to use another
cryptographic tool to create a non-linear odd permutation.
One common problem in cryptography involves producing pseudorandom sequences of bit-
strings. The idea of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is often used to produce such a
sequence. However, LFSRs can also be used to create functions whose input and output are
bitstrings of a specified length. The basic idea of a LFSR is as follows: the output is obtained
by dropping the least significant input bit, shifting the remaining input bits and using the
input bits, along with the coefficients of a specified polynomial of degree k over Z2, to create a
new most significant output bit. A more precise definition of a LFSR is given in Definition 19.
Definition 19. Let q(x) = c0 + c1x+ c2x2 + · · ·+ ck−1xk−1 + xn be a polynomial over Z2[x]
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where c0 6= 0. Define f and f ′ as follows:
f ′ : Zk2 → Z2
〈b0, b1, . . . , bk−1〉 7→ b0c0 ⊕ b1c1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bk−1ck−1
f : Zk2 → Zk2
〈x0, x1 . . . xk−1〉 7→ 〈x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, f ′(〈x0, . . . , xk−1〉)〉
Then f is a linear feedback shift function.
If f is written as a permutation, then the length of its cycles depends on the choice of
q(x). If q(x) is a polynomial without certain properties, then the cycles of f will be of varying
length. However, if q(x) is one of the following type of polynomials, then we can say something
more specific about the cycle decomposition of f .
Definition 20. Let q(x) be a monic polynomial of degree k over the field Z2.
• q(x) is irreducible if q(x) cannot be factored nontrivially over Z2[x].
• q(x) is primitive if q(x) is irreducible and q(x) - xn − 1 for all n < 2k − 1.
Before discussing the cycle decomposition of f , notice that 〈0, . . . , 0〉 is always in a cycle
by itself, because
f ′(〈0, . . . , 0〉) = 0, so
f(〈0, . . . , 0〉) = 〈0, 0, . . . , 0, f ′(〈0, . . . , 0〉)〉
= 〈0, . . . , 0〉
If q(x) is irreducible, then each of the cycles (except the cycle containing 〈0, . . . , 0〉) will have
length t, where t is the order of some root α of q(x) in the multiplicative group F∗
2k
. Because
the order of an element must divide the order of the group, we can see that t | 2k − 1 and
therefore t is odd. So the image of f consists of 2
k−1
t cycles of odd length t and one cycle of
length 1.
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If q(x) is primitive, we are saying precisely that each of its roots has order 2k − 1 in the
group F∗
2k
. Therefore, there is the cycle of length 1 containing 〈0, . . . , 0〉, and then all the other
elements are contained in another cycle (of length 2k − 1).
Also, note that f is clearly a linear function (as the name suggests), because
f ′(x⊕ y) = (x0 ⊕ y0) · c0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ (xk−1 ⊕ yk−1) · · ·k−1
= (x0 · c0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xk−1 · ck−1)⊕ (y0 · c0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yk−1 · ck−1
= f ′(x)⊕ f ′(y), so
f(x⊕ y) = 〈x1 ⊕ y1, . . . , xk−1 ⊕ yk−1, f ′(x⊕ y)〉
= f(x)⊕ f(y)
Based on the discussion above, we would like to modify f in order to solve two problems.
We would like 〈0, . . . , 0〉 to not be in a cycle by itself (so f(〈0, . . . , 0〉) 6= 〈0, . . . , 0〉) and we
would like f to be a nonlinear function. However, we would like to preserve the basic premise
of creating f by shifting input bits and creating one new output bit. Let g denote the function
created by modifying f .
In order to insert 〈0, . . . , 0〉 into a cycle but still produce an output by shifting bits, notice
that we will need to have g(〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉. Let xi denote the bitwise complement
of xi (that is, 0 = 1 and 1 = 0) and define g as follows:
g′ : Zk2 → Z2
〈b0, . . . , bk−1〉 7→ f ′(〈b0, . . . , bk−1〉)⊕ b1 · · · bk−1
g : Zk2 → Zk2
〈x0, . . . , xk−1〉 7→ 〈x1, . . . , xk−1, g′(〈x0, . . . , xk−1〉)〉
Notice that the images of f and g differ only in the placement of 〈0, . . . , 0〉 in their cycle
decompositions. In the image of f , 〈0, . . . , 0〉 is a cycle of length 1. In the image of g, 〈0, . . . , 0〉
is inserted into the cycle containing 〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉 and all other cycles of f are left unchanged.
If q(x) is primitive, then this modified function g produces a De Bruijn sequence. We
would finally like to show that if q(x) is irreducible or primitive, then g is an odd permutation.
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If q(x) is irreducible, then all but one of the cycles have t many elements (where t is odd)
and one cycle (the one where 〈0, . . . , 0〉 was inserted) contains t+ 1 elements. Therefore, g is
made up of a number of even cycles and one odd cycle, so g is an odd permutation. If q(x) is
primitive, it is necessarily irreducible and hence the g is again an odd permutation.
Notice that in order to create g, it is only necessary to store the coefficients of the polynomial
q(x). Therefore, we can produce an odd non-linear permutation from a bitstring of length
k. This implies that this modification to functions produced using LFSRs gives us another
method for creating odd permutations. The function g can be used in conjunction with another
bijection F created using a Feistel network as isotopies to produce a quasigroup (Q, ◦). It
appears that (Q, ◦) will have a large multiplication group and not much structure. (Q, ◦)
would probably have even less structure if it was created by isotopy from a non-abelian group.
However, this conjecture has not yet been verified with computational results.
5.2.3 Complete Mappings
Recall that in Section 4.2, a proof was given of Paige’s result concerning which finite abelian
groups are admissible. The method used in the proof involves beginning with any function
(not necessarily a bijection) and constructing a complete mapping from this function. This
method is completely deterministic. Therefore, it could be coded and used to produce complete
mappings and hence quasigroups. It appears that this construction will usually produce a
non-linear complete mapping. Therefore, this may be another promising method for creating
a large, highly non-associative quasigroup with very little structure. Again, this conjecture
needs to be verified with computational results.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
The original idea of creating a message authentication code based on the properties of
Latin squares and quasigroups can be attributed to Denes and Keedwell in (4). In this dis-
sertation, a new message authentication code, QMAC, is developed whose security is based
on the non-associativity of quasigroups. Recall that in QMAC, only the multiplication order
of the quasigroup elements is secret. In particular, the quasigroup (Q, ◦) can be made public.
Because of this design, QMAC appears to be an improvement on Denes and Keedwell’s MAC.
Several methods for implementing QMAC were discussed and their time and space require-
ments were analyzed. We also addressed issues related to the keyspace and the security of
QMAC.
In order for QMAC to be useful, it is necessary for the underlying quasigroup to have certain
properties. In particular, (Q, ◦) must be large and highly non-associative. We explored various
methods for efficiently creating and storing large quasigroups—isotopies, complete mappings,
and T-functions. Isotopies and complete maps appear to be the most promising methods,
especially if non-affine functions are used. In order to determine “how non-associative” a
quasigroup was, the size of its multiplication group was considered. If the multiplication group
was large, we said that the quasigroup was highly non-associative. We then looked at methods
for creating highly non-associative quasigroups, including non-linear isotopies and complete
mappings. One particularly promising method for creating highly non-associative quasigroups
involves using a Feistel network to produce a non-linear isotopy.
There are still questions which need to be answered about QMAC and the methods dis-
cussed in this dissertation. The most pressing issue involves further study regarding the se-
curity of QMAC. Currently, we only know that QMAC is secure against the attack given in
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Section 3.3.3. Other attacks still need to be developed. QMAC either needs to be demon-
strated secure against this attack or the specifications of QMAC need to be changed in order
to make it secure. In particular, we need to examine whether structure present in (Q, ◦) poses
a security risk to QMAC. If so, then other methods need to be developed for creating the
quasigroup used in QMAC.
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, there are several methods for developing quasigroups
without much structure which appear to have potential. These include creating (Q, ◦) by
non-linear isotopy from a non-abelian group and creating (Q, ◦) using a non-linear complete
mapping. Both these methods need to be explored further.
Finally, we would like to examine other useful methods for determining “how non-associative”
a quasigroup is.
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